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FDP'S VERHEUGEN SUPPORTS BUDGET CUTS

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 4 Jul 81 p 2

/Text/ According to FDP general secretary Verheugen the upcoming measures to restore budgetary soundness should not penalize only employees in the lower and middle income groups. In an interview given yesterday Verheugen said that radical structural changes were required for subsidies and the public service as much as for social services.

Verheugen claimed not to see any immediate danger to the cohesion of the coalition in the imminent debate on the consolidation of government finances. It was the essential goal of both parties by consolidation to regain the political scope for the realization of the joint program. An amount of about DM20 billion was a realistic target for savings.

Verheugen emphatically warned against any skimming off of the large profits earned by the Bundesbank as the result of changes in the exchange rate and the consequent neglect of the necessary budget cuts. Activation of these profits would be tantamount to money creation. "The finance minister might as well print and distribute money." The necessary structural measures would in any case be postponed by only 1 year. He did not believe that their implementation would be easier in 1982, a year bringing four sensitive provincial assembly elections.

According to Verheugen savings in the public service do not mean that civil servant incomes should be allowed to fall behind those of other employees. At the same time we must seriously consider whether the realization of the performance principle in the public service and the reform of the civil service law might not only permit substantial savings but also achieve greater efficiency and productivity. Nor should the defense budget be sacrosanct. The goal of keeping our defensive capability at the necessary level could possibly be achieved at lower cost. "Recent events in the defense ministry tend to evoke many questions regarding the efficiency of our military organization."

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MONTHLY MARKET REPORT REFLECTS UNCERTAINTY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Jul 81 p 9

/Text/ Anyone considering the situation on the stock exchange a sign of the economic climate in the FRG would have to believe that good times are just about to return. Though not rising steeply, the level of stock prices has steadily improved in recent weeks, and declines--though occasionally occurring--are not serious. This phenomenon offers an obvious and blatant contradiction to the rather somer forecasts issued lately. It would probably be wrong to assume that investors expect a short-term change for the better. Evidently to some extent the somewhat longer range investment strategies of foreign investors are involved here as well as some short-term expectations of the revival in the D-mark exchange rate with corresponding profits for foreign investors. Finally investments in stocks may be due to the hope that trading levels will rise as soon as interest rates on the capital market begin to decline.

Unfortunately the expectation of a significant decline in interest rates seems unlikely to come true at any time soon. Though lately there have been some incipient movements in that direction, they quickly petered out again. Some may ascribe this to the high level and instability of American interest rates. However, upon closer scrutiny interest rates are kept high mainly by the strong domestic demand for money, especially government demand. Any Bundesbank attempt to provide relief for business would be bound to result in another devaluation of the D-mark and, by raising domestic prices, the speeding-up of the rate of inflation.

The assessments of the economic situation published lately tend to be contradictory. The Bundesbank is optimistic about the level and prospects of business development but fears another surge in prices. The Ifo Institute for Economic Research (Munich) holds that the economy has bottomed out and is unlikely further to worsen. The Institute for World Economy in Kiel, on the other hand, forecasts another drop in the fall, and the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin notes hardly any symptoms other than the revival of exports to indicate an upturn in the economy as a whole. In its latest special report the council of experts arrived at the conclusion that the revival would be slower to materialize than it had assumed in last year's fall prediction.

Exaggerated optimism has been somewhat muted after publication of the latest data on the receipt of orders. In April the index exceeded the previous year's first quarter by 9.7 percent, but the rate of growth fell back to 0.6 percent in May.

Obviously the April result was overstated as the result of some major orders--especially from abroad. We will have to wait for the June figures to get a clear picture of the trend. At any rate, the results of the Ifo Institute's May business poll do not indicate a more pessimistic estimate of business prospects for the next 6 months, though the situation for May alone was judged somewhat less favorably.

Exports continue to be the prop of the domestic economic situation. In May they were 8 percent higher than a year before. The fact that orders from abroad--even in May--displayed a rising trend compared with 1980 is increasingly reflected in the foreign trade data. On the other hand imports are growing much more slowly despite the rise in import prices.

May was somewhat disappointing insofar as the balance of trade surplus declined to DM1.6 billion (April: DM3.3 billion). According to the Bundesbank this has not changed the overall trend toward improvement. Seasonally adjusted the foreign trade surplus in the average of April and May amounted to DM2.3 billion, compared with the mere maintenance of a balanced result in February and March. It is therefore quite possible that the current account will--at least--not decline even more into the red. and that as a result the disagreeable devaluation of the D-mark vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar will stop or even--as many expect--the trend of exchange rates reverse once again.

It is characteristic of the domestic situation that the normal seasonal increase in employment failed to occur in June. Unemployment has risen by 1.4 percent to 1,126 million in June as compared with May. Evidently we must expect after all that average 1981 unemployment will exceed the 1.2 million earlier assumed. Current estimates mention a figure of up to 1.3 million. Both the Kiel and the Berlin institutes assume 1.4 million unemployed by the end of the year.

This high rate of unemployment must certainly be considered in connection with the restructuring measures now under way. As reported by the Ifo Institutes, changes in production programs and methods are increasingly emphasized in investment planning. According to the plan data to hand the decline in gross fixed investments to be expected as per the current phase of the business cycle will not materialize. This is due largely to the persistent investment impetus provided by technology and the changed energy price situation. Actually that is a very hopeful aspect which seems to make a deeper recession unlikely. However, the eminently desirable improvement in the employment situation will probably occur only after an unfortunately lengthy delay.

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OVERVIEW OF FRG ARMS INDUSTRY

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4-5 Jul 81 p 36

/Report by Volker Woerl: "German Arms Industry--Neither Colossus Nor Dwarf"/

/Text/ The vehement for and against regarding the export of German Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia, the hotly disputed sales of German submarines to Chile, the cost overruns of the MRCA Tornado combat aircraft--all this has once again stirred up interest in the German arms industry. Questions are asked: How important is defense demand for the operation of German industry? What is the role of exports? Are business interests paramount or do politics dominate? The German weapons industry of the early 1980's represents neither a colossus bestriding the entire national economy nor a negligible dimension.

At the latest Paris Air Show in Le Bourget the German aircraft industry showed its paces. The Tornado combat aircraft, developed jointly with Britain and Italy, was one of the stars of the show. Though "the greatest arms programs since the birth of Christ"--to quote then Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt--has, luckily, demonstrated its fire power not in actual combat but only in the explosion of poorly computed budget estimates, it may rely on the international respect of technicians and defense experts.

The Tornado offers an example of the explosive cost escalation in modern defense procurement. At last year's Hannover Air Show Federal Defense Minister Apel cited the following instance: In 1965 a Starfighter cost about DM5.5 million; by now the price of the fully equipped Tornado has climbed to DM67 million, the so-called "fly away" price of the aircraft alone runs to more than DM35 million. In addition to the political problems of arms exports we are faced with the question: What countries are actually able to pay this kind of price? Even our relatively prosperous country has reached the limits of its ability to pay, given its growing economic problems and the desolate financial situation.

Half a Million Scientists

Compared with other sectors weapons technology has made immense strides in recent years. Demands here are greater than anywhere else: As light, as small and as efficient as possible. Pressures must be handled, problems of stability solved and

material requirements met, which exceed by many multiples the standards customary in, for instance, automobile manufacture. To cite just one example: To observe the effect of projectiles on the target upon impact, the Rheinmetall Corporation of Duesseldorf developed photographic processes which work on a billionth of a second.

It is estimated that, worldwide, about half a million scientists--some 50 percent of all those workin in science--are employed in the defense industry. To some extent they must develop methods, construct devices and meet demands which are not the subject of instruction at any university or college. This calls for expensive and lengthy research and development within the industry.

All this is conceived, developed, constructed, built and sold in order to build up an immense potential for destruction and annihilation. Last year about $500 billion were spent on defense worldwide. Politics must supply the rationale. It is actually quite likely that the policy of securing peace did protect Western Europe against a new war after 1945, while more than 120 military conflicts erupted elsewhere. By now, though, we must ask ourselves whether the overkill capacity, the ability to annihilate the enemy several times over, may not have far exceeded any reasonable criterion.

Former U.S.Defense Secretary and long-standing World Bank President Robert McNamara referred to this issue when he wrote: "No government may yield its responsibility for ensuring for its society an appropriate and reasonable defense. That is imperative in an imperfect world. But it is just as imperative to learn that the concept of security embraces more than mere military strength, and that a society may approach the point where additional defense expenditure no longer creates greater security."

Some figures may demonstrate how much the overkill capacity has already flourished; they were quoted by Aurelio Peccei, president of the Club of Rome in his latest book with the title--as soothing as it is questionable--"The Future in Our Hands": "...In World War II the heaviest bombs had an explosive force of more than 10 tons TNT (trinitrotoluene), the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 already had a force of 13,000 tons, and now we have nuclear warheads with an explosive force corresponding to 25 million tons TNT. The total explosive force of the nuclear weapons in all the arsenals amounts to more than 15 billion tons TNT. This means that everyone on this earth, including women and children, sits on a powder keg containing 3 tons of high explosive, which might be detonated at any time.

2,000 or More Employees?

It is all the more amazing and incomprehensible that there are no exact data available about the type and volume of the German arms industry. The 1979 White Paper issued by the Federal Defense Ministry cites some 200,000 employees in the industry; that would represent less than 1 percent of all gainfully employed persons. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) shies away from giving exact figures, one of the reasons being the large numbers (thousands) of component firms supplying the arms industry. In fact attribution is difficult here as well as for the manufacturers of various consumer goods, who also work for the Bundeswehr. That applies from the screw which is later mounted in a weapon to the production of shoes or foods. With all these reservations the BDI calculates that about 270,000 persons are

employed in the manufacture of weapons. Hans Hockel, chairman of the board of Rheinmetall AG, whose firm has processed some very interesting material in a collection of documents on the topic of defense technology, even speaks of up to 400,000 employees provided one goes back far enough and includes, for example, the miner who produces coal for the steel plant where, in turn, the raw material for tank panels is manufactured. The Bundeswehr itself has 495,000 men under arms and 180,000 civilian employees.

No less confusing are the available data regarding turnover. The White Paper quotes the following figures of domestic arms expenditures by the defense department: 1975--DM8.1 billion, 1976--DM8.6 billion, 1977--DM9.7 billion and 1978--DM10.5 billion. "Total weapons production," it is claimed, "does not exceed 2.5 percent of the annual product value in processing industry." The 1981 defense budget (total volume DM42 billion) shows the following: Research and development DM1.5 billion, military procurement DM10.3 billion and materiel maintenance DM3.7 billion. That is a volume of DM15.5 billion, most of which appear in the accounts of the industry as turnover. However, some DM2 billion of that amount are accounted for by purchases abroad.

Almost DM40 Billion

Last year the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin gave a very different account. According to this the ultimate domestic demand on the German economy for defense goods and services amounted to DM15.1 billion in 1976--no later data are available. The DIW therefore computed a gross output value which it equates with turnover--DM27.9 billion. This figure includes all work previously done, components and services--including the potatoes eaten in the mess halls or the work of an attorney consulted by the armed forces. This substantially higher amount is based on a so-called input-output calculation which includes some duplications. If we were to work from the DM27.9 billion figure to arrive at this year's amount, we would not be far off DM40 billion.

In other words, we get very different figures depending on the use of either the budget effective ultimate demand or the gross output value. We get an idea of the dimensions involved if we contrast these figures with, for instance, the corporate turnover of Daimler-Benz (roughly DM31 billion in 1980).

For 1970-1979, a fairly long period, the 1981 defense budget cites direct Bundeswehr purchases from German firms as amounting to DM92 billion. Industry, at 82.7 percent, took the lion's share. Added to this must be construction contracts placed by the Laender on behalf of the Federal Government, valued at some DM19 billion. Since the establishment of the Bundeswehr, for example, about 166,000 apartments and houses were built and modernized for dependents of members of the armed forces at a cost of more than DM6 billion.

A New Weapons Generation

As regards investments in weapons the Bundeswehr is right in the middle of a long-range generational change with regard to major weapons systems. These include, among others, the Leopard 2 combat tank, the Gepard anti-aircraft tank, the Roland

anti-aircraft and antimissile tank, the Fox armored transport carriers, the No 70 field howitzer, a new generation of motor vehicles, antitank helicopters, liaison and observation helicopters for the army. In the foreground for the air force is the MRCA-Tornado combat aircraft, 20 of which are to be delivered this year and 44 annually from 1982 on. It will be joined by the Alpha Jet ground support aircraft and the AWACS early warning system. The navy will be equipped with the new No 122 frigate, the 143A fast torpedo boat and the Troika minsweeper. It is also intended to raise the combat efficiency of the Breguet Atlantic antisubmarine aircraft. All in all this new generation of weapons (qualifying date for prices 31 December 1979) will cost roughly DM59 billion. Some DM21 billion have already been paid out. The 1981 budget provides about DM7 billion for the change of generations; another DM20 billion will be budgeted for the years through 1984. The remainder will fall due later.

These billions are calculated from respectable prices per unit. A frigate, for example, costs DM500-600 million depending on its equipment (in the meantime price increases have been announced); the Bundeswehr pays about DM7 million for one Gepard anti-aircraft tank, slightly more than half that amount for the Leopard 2 and approximately DM1.5 million for a field howitzer. Moreover, every grenade for the 120-mm cannon of the Leopard 2 costs from DM1,200-1,500.

When we consider the structure of the German arms industry we must distinguish between various groups of firms. There are no arms firms working exclusively or almost exclusively for the Bundeswehr. However, in the case of a few companies the proportion is very great indeed, for example in the aviation and space industry.

MBB Out in Front

After its merger with the Vereinigten Flugtechnischen Werken /United Aircraft Works/ of Bremen, Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH (MBB) is far ahead in first place. This year the corporation (employing some 38,500 people) will have a turnover of at least DM5 billion; just about 60 percent will be accounted for by weapons sales. MBB as the producer of aircraft, helicopters and a large range of weaponry is thus the most important arms firm in the Federal Republic. In 1979 roughly two-thirds of the DM870 million turnover of the Dornier Group was accounted for by defense customers. Motoren- und Turbinen-Union GmbH (MTU), Munich/Friedrichshafen, the largest German manufacturer of aircraft engines and heavy diesel engines--especially for ships and tanks--achieved almost DM1.6 billion turnover, 45 percent of which represented defense contracts.

In second and third place behind MBB (in absolute figures), though at a considerable distance, are the electrical engineering corporations Siemens and AEG-Telefunken. However, at DM1.3 billion and DM1.6-1.8 billion, deliveries by these firms to the Bundeswehr represent only relatively small percentages of the total turnover. At Siemens, in particular, there is much reluctance to talk of weapons at all; the defense production of the corporation is not subject to the military weapons control law. Actually, though, communication devices and electronics are just as important for any modern army as "anything which shoots." AEG-Telefunken is the general contractor for the new generation of fast torpedo boats, supplier of radar equipment, control and guidance systems for ultra modern weapons.

Rheinmetall AG is one of the oldest German weapons producers. Some DM800 million of its DM1.7 billion turnover (1980) went to the account of defense procurements. Rheinmetall GmbH, Duesseldorf, is reputedly the largest private European manufacturer of cannon--in Britain and France these weapons are largely produced by state owned firms and arsenals. Among its production program are weapons ranging from machine guns to cannon and tank turrets for the Leopard tanks and to 155-mm caliber artillery guns. In the test stage now are "intelligent missiles" which may be guided in the ultimate stage.

German industry boasts tradition and experience in tank construction; defense experts consider its designs the best worldwide. International interest is correspondingly great. Krauss-Maffei AG, Munich, part of the Flick Corporation, is the general contractor for the Leopard. Last year defense contracts earned DM970 million of its DM1.4 billion turnover. These figures reflect the pressure of the tapering off of the Leopard 1 and Gepard series because in 1979 corresponding sales still amounted to DM2 billion (including DM1.7 billion for tank construction). Admittedly a large part of this turnover consists of components. Only about 1,250 of the 4,700 strong labor force are engaged in tank construction. A total of more than 4,000 Leopard 1 were ordered and constructed; the Bundeswehr alone purchased more than 2,400. Ten other NATO countries and Australia also bought it.

The Bundeswehr ordered 1,800 of the successor tanks; about 100 have already been delivered. Another 445 are to be exported to the Netherlands. By the end of this year the monthly output is to rise to 20 Leopard 2. For years past potential foreign clients have filed in and out at the head office in Munich-Allach. Exports hold a share of roughly one third in the arms business. Particularly great is Saudi Arabian interest in this weapons system.

Incidentally, some 2,000 component suppliers share in the production of the Leopard. Beside Krauss-Maffei the Maschinenbau GmbH (MAK) in Kiel also works on the final assembly of the tank. This firm, a member of the Krupp Corporation, has a turnover amounting to about DM560 million--30 percent of which is defense oriented. It is also an important supplier of the Federal Navy. The corporation as a whole--in former times a prime example of a "weapons forge"--has a roughly DM14 billion turnover, only 3 percent of which are accounted for by arms sales.

The Diehl-Unternehmensgruppe of Nuremberg is one of the major German ammunition manufacturers. Its DM1.4 billion sales in 1979 included some 40 percent derived from military contracts. The group includes Mauser which manufacturers mainly automatic weapons. Heckler and Koch, Oberndorff/Neckar, is the leading producer of infantry weapons; it has some 2,000 employees.

The export oriented shipyards occupy a special place in the arms business. Last year they turned over about DM5.3 billion with some 60,000 employees; roughly DM4.5 billion were accounted for by shipbuilding, half a billion by naval procurements generally. This sector is subject to violent fluctuations because it usually involves small series at elevated unit prices.

The largest German ship construction firm, for example, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW), Hamburg/Kiel, earned DM230 million of its just over DM1 billion 1980 turnover from defense contracts--exports exclusively. HDW is internationally renowned

as the market leader in the construction of conventional submarines, and here even a small number of items serve to buttress its status. At the latest return date 12 submarines were listed in the order books, though admittedly 6 of them represented orders from Iran--transactions plagued by many a question mark--and 2 submarines had been order by Chile and are still subject to hot political disputes. Involved here are ships of 1,200-1,500 tons each, which, depending on the electronics equipment, cost from DM130-DM150 million a piece.

The Bremer Vulkan AG is the general contractor for the construction of the six Bundeswehr frigates which, in order to spread employment, were distributed over five shipyards, though this is a most uneconomic way of handling construction. The volume of defense contracts is well above average at Blohm and Voss AG, Hamburg, accounting for about a third of the DM633 million turnover (1977). On the average the major German shipyards sell about 15 percent of their output to the military. Early this year the order stock amounted to 11 frigates, 4 corvettes, 6 submarines (excluding Iran) and 39 fast torpedo boats. In addition there are constructions under license at foreign shipyards.

No Tool of Stimulation

"By their volume and nature arms orders are not suitable tools of economic stimulation. From the aspect of employment and business management it is indeed in the general interest to achieve the most even possible utilization of the corporate sections specializing in arms production. All those involved are therefore confronted with a standing task." This quote comes from the 1979 White Paper. As any lack of continuity in arms orders results in exaggerated employment fluctuations and the accompanying high risks, prominent industry managers urge the liberalization of exports--at least on the same terms as in the United States, Britain and France.

According to the Defense Ministry German arms exports were subject to wide fluctuations in recent years, ranging from DM0.7 billion in 1974 to almost DM2 billion in 1977, when large exports of ships drove up the figures. Here again the data differ. One estimate claims that weapons to a value of DM1.5-2.5 billion were exported in 1980. According to other sources arms exports worth just under DM6 billion were approved in 1975-1979. In view of the uncertain figures we must consider equally dubious a table of leading arms exporters--listed by year. As per the data of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) the United States exported weapons worth $5.4 billion in 1975-1977, the USSR $4.2 billion, France $890 million, Britain $620 million and the FRG $580 million.

At the same time ACDA arrives at the remarkable ratio of only 30 percent of German exports to NATO and other friendly countries to 70 percent to the Third World. At Bundeswehr headquarters, on the other hand, it is claimed that 75 percent of all weapons exports went to the NATO countries. Against according to ACDA the proportion of arms exports in total German exports achieved an average of 0.60 percent in 1975-1977, compared with only 0.34 percent in 1967-1969. Sometimes the divergence in the figures is no more than a question of compilation methods: At MBB, for example, direct weapons exports are not particularly important. When, however, we include involvement in exports by way of international cooperation--for instance the German-French subsidiary Euromissile--the 1980 result amounts to about DM1.4 billion.

The military weapons control law and the foreign trade law are the laws affecting arms exports. Neither of them, though, settles one crucial question--where exports may legitimately go. Used for years was the concept of areas of tension, a most dubious term because it lends itself to various political interpretations and also tends in the course of time to change with respect to geography.

Despite the fervent wish for a review German industry continues to acknowledge the primacy of politics regarding this issue. Still, political considerations should certainly not stop at the area of tension concept. The FRG's supplies of energy and raw materials and, on the other side, the need for security of important supplier countries are corresponding dimensions. At the same time we may not in this exceedingly sensitive business allow political morality to be dismissed as no more than a tiresome ballast. The same reservation applies to any consideration of the principle preferred among industrialists: "Deliveries are neither good nor bad, decisive is the political object." BDI president Professor Rodenstock commented this in an interview: "Politics, taking into consideration our national interests, must determine whether and where deliveries are justified." However, if we more precisely define this principle so as to permit arms exports only if we may expect a common line for some time to come, a "but" immediately comes to mind: How can we ever be sure? There are many examples of the fallacy of this argument.

Politicians and economists should free Federal German arms from the nebulae of obscurity and set it into the reality of international politics. We may be permitted this conclusion: Just as the production of weapons and war materiel may make peace more secure in our actual situation, politically controlled arms exports may achieve the same. However, despite all political and juridical safeguards the risk of deadly abuse drives and flies along in each exported Leopard and Tornado.

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EREL STRESSES NEED FOR IMPORT SUBSTITUTION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 9 Jul 81 p 8

[Commentary by Teoman Erel]

[Text] We are learning from the series by our friend Mete Aykol that Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal is adroitly using in foreign markets the domestic reaction and criticism that has emerged from the painful character of his economic policy. He is doing very well at it.

It is true that the character, articles, and even the reaction and criticism expressed in a taped song are not designed to give Ozal bargaining power abroad. They hope to dredge up the problems and expound upon the errors....

But one can see in this the limits of Turkish tolerance toward an economic prescription. Anyway, this is how it is being explained to the outside.

Caglayangil in his time used to apply as foreign minister a tactic similar to that used by Ozal. When a certain point was reached in critical talks that demanded sacrifices from Turkey, he would say, "No. If I accept this I could not justify it to my coalition partners. I cannot stop the Hodja's (Erbakan's) reaction. Public opinion would be thrown into turmoil..."

An overly sensitive public opinion constantly on guard is an exaggeration. We have experienced its harmful side. But a public opinion that criticizes is an advantage in the hand of one who uses it well to preserve domestic equilibria and maintain foreign equilibria in line with national interests.

But let's get to our topic: import substitution. Both Western financial circles that provide us with aid and Turgut Ozal must soften their attitudes on the outright rejection of import substitution. This approach would not deviate from the current economic program. It is even highly likely that this would occasionally bolster the program.

"Import substitution" means the start of domestic production for commodities and goods previously imported, thus sparing the need to import them.

In the past Turkey gave broad play to this method. One cannot deny that TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) President Ali Kocman endorsed it during an Izmir meeting and that this policy has yielded good results.

It is said that because of over-adherence to this policy, the economy and industry became totally introverted structures and retarded with respect to generating the necessary exports. There is some truth in this criticism. But what country has become industrialized and set toward a sound export policy without recourse to import substitution?

It is not easy to explain how the desires of Ataturk's Turkey since the War of Independence for industrialization, independence and modernization can be achieved if import substitution is rejected.

Mr Ozal has sternly rejected import substitution for a long time. He has regarded it as a disease that would corrode both the investments and industrial facilities he is to provide as well as the economic model he embraces.

But the facts are slowly weighing in and a more flexible mentality is emerging in this regard. An example of this was seen at a conference held in Istanbul's Tarabya Hotel. Johns Hopkins University professor and World Bank counselor Bela Balassa stated in his address that the economic policy being implemented in Turkey is yielding positive results. He continued, "The measures already taken must be bolstered by additional measures. These measures must be directed toward strengthening...exports and productive import substitution."

Can't Ozal and his associates, who, like him, reject outright import substitution as a premise, show as much flexibility as the American professor, who is a World Bank expert?

In actuality, it seems to us that practical attitudes are possible.... Slight movements in this direction have already begun.

We were pleased to learn that the capacities of investor and consumer institutions to produce machine, industrial and spare parts is being studied in the State Planning Organization (SPO), headed by Yildirim Akturk, the highly trusted engineer friend of Turgut Ozal.

According to non-published information gathered from SPO officials, the resources of manufacturing plants belonging to such institutions as the machine chemical industry, the sugar industry, iron and steel works, and Etibank were reportedly reviewed in meetings between SEE (State Economic Enterprises) representatives and SPO experts.

The aim was reportedly to minimize dependency on foreign exchange and foreign financing for investments....

So, import substitition....

If we truly desire Turkey's extrication from this crisis without its total collapse and before completely retarding its production and investment capability, we must make use of import substitution in addition to export mobilization.

Our foreign exchange resources are limited.

The discussion takes a biased turn when import substitution yielding foreign exchange is portrayed as an "etatist" goal. No matter whether the private sector or the public sector uses import substitution, if there is lucrative and useful production and if foreign exchange is secured, it benefits the national economy.

Moreover, as with the famous Moliere hero who said, "I have supposedly been discoursing on prose for 40 years but you could not prove it by me," Turkey at no time over the last 40 years--including now--has completely abandoned import substitution. Turkey has pursued it despite all sorts of foreign overtures.

As a typical example, in ceremonies for plants geared to import-substitute military production that have either opened or had their foundations laid after 12 September, certain well-known civilians who reject this approach have been ubiquitous with the happiest smiles and most bubbling speeches.

CSO: 4654/103

EVREN CALLS FOR MULTIFACETED ECONOMIC PROGRESS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 17 Jun 81 pp 1, 7

[Text] Chief of State General Kenan Evren said yesterday "We are going to develop in the field of agriculture, we are going to develop in the field of tourism, it is only in this way that we are going to attain self-sufficiency."

Evren, who came to Antayla on Sunday together with National Security Council members Nurettin Ersin and Nejat Tumer, paid a visit at 1740 hours yesterday to the governor's office. Evren and the commanders were greeted in front of the building by Governor Yilmaz Turktekin and Mayor Nuri Teoman and given a briefing on the city's problems.

After the briefing, which lasted 75 minutes, Evren gave a short speech to a crowd of well wishers who had assembled in front of the building and announced that he had come to Antalya for a week's rest. Stating that he had obtained information from the governor and the mayor on the city's tourism efforts and other questions Evren said in summary:

"I had special reasons for coming here. When we first undertook our duties I obtained information from the Ministry of Tourism and asked that this region be given top priority in the area of tourism and that all related investments be given precedence.

I allocated a portion of my vacation time to see the work in progress locally and to get information on this subject from the governor and the mayor, and so I came to the governor's office today (yesterday). We received this information, and we also obtained information on other problems. We shall study and evaluate it. From the standpoint of tourism Antalya is one of the leading regions on the Mediterranean coast. However much investment we make here we should be able to attract a proportionate number of tourists.

At various times I have stated in my speeches that we are going to develop in the area of agriculture, we are going to develop in the area of tourism, it is only in this way that we are going to be able to attain self-sufficiency."

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FOREIGN CREDIT REDUCTION STRIKES AT FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Jun 81 p 5

[Text] Total inflow of foreign exchange in the first 3 months of 1981 amounted to $1,347,000,000, representing a 13-percent increase over the comparable period of 1980. Exchange from exports and workers' remittances increased by a large margin whereas foreign credits suffered a major decline in comparison with the previous year, and consequently this very much limited the overall increase in foreign exchange inflow. Parallel to this development the Central Bank reported that its holdings of foreign exchange and cash on hand, which at the beginning of the year amounted to approximately $824 million, had dwindled to $729 million at the end of March.

Receipts of foreign exchange from export sales during the first 3 months of 1981 exceeded that for the previous year by 66 percent, amounting to $809.2 million. At the same time foreign exchange inflow from foreign sales during the month of March exceeded that for the same month [of the previous year] and for the first 3 months of the year amounted to more than 79 percent of total exports [for the previous year].

Worker remittances amounting to more than $368 million also exceeded the amount for the same period of the previous year (around $214 million for the 3 months period) by 72 percent.

In contrast to these positive developments in exports and worker remittances, the amount of foreign credits transferred to the Central Bank during the first 3 months of 1981 underwent a major decline. Whereas last year $590 million in foreign credit were received during the first 3 months, the amount for the same period this year scarcely reached $170 million. This decline of 71 percent off-set the positive effect of the foreign sales and worker remittances so that total inflow of foreign exchange during the first 3 months of the year registered only a 13-percent increase over the previous year ($155 million).

Taking a look at the breakdown of the credits transferred to the Central Bank during the first 3 months of this year it is noteworthy that there has been an increase in credits obtained from affiliates of the World Bank in the form of

banker credits and in credits from the European Resettlement Fund. Apart from these $50 million has been received from Saudi Arabia, but in contrast there has been a reduction of $288 million in "cash" credits, which is of major significance. As for Consortium credits they are just behind the previous year's level of $22 million.

Inflow of Foreign Exchange During
the First 3 Months of 1981
(in millions of dollars)

	1981	1980	Difference
Foreign exchange from foreign sales	809.2	487.1	+ % 66
Foreign exchange from workers' remittances	368.3	214.2	+ % 72
External credits	169.7	590.4	- % 71
Total inflow of foreign exchange	1,347.2	1,191.6	+ % 13

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CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY LEGISLATION COMES TO FOREFRONT

'HURRIYET' Discusses Milieu of Bill

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 25 Jun 81 pp 1, 19

[Article by Cuneyt Arcayurek]

[Text] Ankara -- We are on the brink of intensive efforts on the "new order" which will convert the period begun on 12 September into a parliamentary democratic order.

A series of laws on the structure of the state, including the Constituent Assembly Law, will be discussed and given final form in the National Security Council [NSC], whose stepped-up schedule for the summer has been noted. The time to watch in this connection is the last days of June and the month of July.

Head of State Evren had said that the major outlines of the law on the Constituent Assembly would be announced in June. Everyone is writing in large print that the preparations for the Constituent Assembly Law are under way. In fact, the technicians are finished with the law and have submitted it to the NSC.

The Constituent Assembly Law will soon take final form in the NSC -- barring any unusual obstacle at the last minute. These discussions may not be concluded by the end of June and may stretch a few days into July.

Almost everyone has tidbits of information on the major lines of the Constituent Assembly [CA]. The important thing is the powers and functions of the CA. What will it be empowered to debate and to what extent, how much power will it have -- this is the essential question. The answers to be given to these questions will put an end to the debate over whether the CA will be a true representative assembly or a consultative body dependent on the NSC.

Until Resolution No 52 was issued by the NSC, the idea had been debated that future members of the CA should be somehow elected. Thought had been given to the idea of having the head men of a province meet to choose that province's members from among several candidates. As you know, all elected officials, including parliamentarians, were removed from their jobs after 12 September, with only head men being allowed to retain their positions.

However, political party leaders, who have been barred from political activity since 12 September, began making speeches or writing letters last month calling for election of CA members. As the liklihood gained strength that political conflict would return along with the CA, the concept of member selection by head men, being somewhat analogous to election, was scrapped. And then Resolution No 52 was issued by the NSC stressing the need to avoid politics...

What Kind of Assembly

This is how the concept gained strength that CA members should be designated by a commission headed by the governor of each province proportional to the province's population. The law is expected to contain basic principles such as the requirement that provincial candidates be no less than 30 to 40 years old and have a higher education. On the other hand, it is said that the higher education condition will not be sought for members to be designated by the NSC for one-third of a province's members, thus assuring the presence in the CA of respected persons familiar with the masses and their problems. It is understood that the NSC, in choosing the members itself, will take a broad approach to the task, trying to include in the assembly truly informed, reliable elements from almost every sector.

It may be said that the CA will be "limited" as to powers and functions. Preliminary information indicated that the CA would have an agenda limited to the constitution and political parties and elections laws.

Recent information, however, gives the impression that the CA will act as a "semi-parliament," doing more than just drafting the aforementioned laws. It may also have such functions as obtaining information from the government on various national topics at the request of one or more members, bringing questions before the assembly, discussing the state budget and discussing other laws drafted by the government in addition to the specified three laws.

The CA will not conduct business in the known manner of classic parliaments such as government oversight, voting governments in or out or initiating interpellation of ministers.

It is possible that the CA will devote certain days of the week to writing the constitution, which is its primary function, and will also designate days for the work we mentioned on other laws.

The final form of any law approved by the CA -- as announced by the head of state -- will be up to the NSC. Bringing a government down, giving a vote of confidence, approving the budget or performing any oversight task will remain in the purview of the NSC, which has assumed the duties of the Turkish Grand National Assembly since 12 September.

With the new order, however, a climate of "open debate" will be introduced into the legislative work which has been going on since 12 September. The debates held and the opinions presented in the CA on a law, a constitution or even a budget will certainly be important elements which the NSC will keep foremost in mind in its deliberations on the topic. The CA will introduce into our -- preparliamentary democracy -- daily lives an important factor in that arrangements made thereafter will take place in a climate of debate, with public trends being taken into account.

Care will be taken that this climate of debate not take the direction of any political party. This is the first of the major reasons for not having the CA formed by a broader electoral system.

Debate, yes; but partisan haggling in the set molds of fanaticism, no.

Other Arrangements

One other point on which we feel the need to place emphasis in the days ahead is this:

The CA may begin work in earnest in October. Much is being made of the "need for time" for new arrangements to be made, starting with the selection of members after announcement of the law by the authorities.

However, the administration will quickly make certain important legal arrangements closely concerned with the vitality of the state until the CA begins work. Some of these will be out in July. For example, the administration revised the power of the judiciary with the formation of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors and will make revisions concerning the Council of State which it is believed will eliminate its drawbacks. The establishment of regional courts as the point of prior appeal to the Council of State is a pertinent topic at present. Other laws dealing with the power of the judiciary are also known to be in the preparatory stages. Enactment of them is expected by the end of the month.

One official said, "The Council of State, the model of which we took from France, has survived in this country for 150 years. The total number of decisions it has handed down in 150 years, however, is about the same as the number of rulings we have in one month," and revealed in this point of view the rationale for revision.

It is early yet to give extensive information, but the idea that the constitution should be drafted by a committee prior to the CA finds no advocates. Moreover, no decision has yet been made on whether articles of the 1961 Constitution will be changed or an entirely new constitution drafted. However, there are advocates in official circles of the view: "While putting the state in order, we want to set democracy on sound foundations. In that case, the need is clear to write a new constitution applicable to the structure of Turkey in light of past experience."

Let there be no doubt that the basic principle of this new constitution will be directed toward secular, social and libertarian democracy.

To speak succintly, we will enter a new stage in the days ahead.

And we will see a great variety of new configurations.

Constituent Assembly Law Published

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 1 Jul 81 pp 1, 7

[Verbatim text of Constituent Assembly Law and Rationale; term "National Security Council," here abbreviated to NSC, is consistently spelled out in the law text]

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) -- The Constituent Assembly Law, approved day before yesterday by the NSC has entered into effect by publication in yesterday's edition of the RESMI GAZETE.

The law, which bans all those who were members of a political party on 11 September 1980 from the CA, envisages a 160-member Assembly. According to the law, 40 members will be selected by the NSC and 120 will be chosen by the NSC from among candidates.

The law, which allows Turkish citizens who have a higher education and are at least 30 years old to be candidates for the CA, provides for the CA to be composed of the NSC members and a consultative assembly and to have eight [as published] members from Istanbul and five from Izmir.

Following verbatim are the rationale and articles of Constituent Assembly Law No 2485, which bears the signatures of Evren and the NSC members:

"The purpose of the 12 September action, which the Turkish Armed Forces, being mindful of their historic responsibility, realized throughout the chain of command in a climate in which the parliament, the basic institution of the multi-party democratic regime, could not function and the country was on the brink of civil war, was summarized as follows in National Security Council Communique No 1:

"'To preserve the national integrity, to ensure national unity and cohesion, to prevent an impending civil war and conflict between brothers, to restore the authority and existence of the state and to eliminate the causes preventing the function of the democratic order.'

"In the statement by the NSC Chairman broadcast on radio and television on 12 September 1980, the route to be followed in order that the action accomplish its purpose was announced and it was promised that, subsequent to the drafting of electoral and parties laws and a Constitution to prevent the degeneration and impediment of the free, democratic parliamentary system and concordant with Turkish society and to the fashioning of revisions parallel to them and with the realization of social justice which put respect for the human rights and freedoms and national solidarity first, 'the governing of the nation would be turned over to an administration based on the rule of democratic, secular and social law.'

"Bearing in mind the climate in which our country found itself on 11 September 1980 and the causes giving rise to it, the purpose of the 12 September action is understood to be not 'to return to the democratic order,' but 'to establish a democratic order' which is sound and healthy. 12 September is not, as some individuals and circles try to demonstrate, a deviation or separation from democracy, but rather expresses the beginning of action to save a democratic regime which the Turkish people desire and which is truly secular from final collapse and to put it on a strong and healthy foundation.

"Parliament had to be abolished on 12 September, and Law No 2324 provided for the duties and authorities pertaining to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the National Assembly and the Republican Senate to be carried out and exercised by the NSC and for the duties and authorities pertaining to the President of the Republic, by the Head of State, who is the Council Chairman.

"It was considered appropriate that an Assembly be formed to contribute to the NSC's exercise of its legislative duties and to ensure a broader relationship with the public through open discussions, and the law on the Constituent Assembly was proposed with this in mind.

"It has been resolved that the Constituent Assembly should be formed to write the Constitution and political parties and electoral laws with the legal arrangements necessary for establishment of a democratic, secular legal state to protect the existence and independence of the State of the Republic of Turkey, the integrity and indivisibility of the nation and the people and the tranquillity of society and to ensure the supremacy of the law and that everyone has equal access to human rights and the fundamental rights within an understanding of social justice and national solidarity and that the Constituent Assembly should be terminated upon the initiation of actual duty of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be formed through general elections."

Constituent Assembly

Structure of the Constituent Assembly

Article 1:

1. The Constituent Assembly shall consist of the NSC and a Consultative Assembly, the formation, duties and powers of which are set forth in this law.

2. In matters remaining outside the provisions of this law, the NSC shall perform the duties and exercise the powers pertaining to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the National Assembly and the Republican Senate in accordance with the Law on the Constitutional Order No 2324.

Duties of the Constituent Assembly

Article 2:

Duties of the Constituent Assembly:

A) To draft the new Constitution and the law for submission of the Constitution to the public.

B) To draft the Political Parties Law in compliance with principles of the Constitution, which shall take final form by submission to the public and approval by the nation and which shall enter into effect in accordance with interim-provisions.

C) To draft the Electoral Law, bearing in mind the provisions of the new Constitution and Political Parties Law.

D) To perform legislative duties by enactment, amendment and rescission of laws until the formation and initiation of actual duty of the Turkish Grand National Assembly through general elections to be held on a date to be decided upon by the NSC.

Consultative Assembly

Structure of the Consultative Assembly

Article 3:

The Consultative Assembly shall be composed of 160 members, to include 120 members selected by the NSC from among candidates fielded by each province in accordance with procedures and principles set forth in the following articles and 40 members selected directly by the NSC.

Conditions for Membership

Article 4:

1. Possession of the following conditions is required for selection for the Consultative Assembly:

A) To be a Turkish citizen,

B) To be at least 30 years of age,

C) To have a higher education,

D) Not to be restricted or banned from public service,

E) To have performed or be considered to have performed compulsory military service or have no obligation,

F) To have no record of penal servitude or imprisonment in excess of 1 year, excluding imprudent offenses, or not to have been convicted of any one of such shameful crimes as debt, embezzlement, corruption, bribery, theft, fraud, counterfeiting, breach of trust and fraudulent bankruptcy.

G) Not to have been a member of any political party on 11 September 1980.

2. The condition set forth in paragraph 1(C) shall not be sought in those selected directly by the NSC for the Consultative Assembly.

Number of Candidates to Be Fielded by Provinces

Article 5:

The numbers of members to be selected for the Consultative Assembly from the candidates fielded by each province on the basis of population figures from the last census are set forth in the table annexed to this law.

Conditions for Provincial Candidates

Article 6:

Those desiring to be candidates from the provinces shall petition the office of the governor of the province as to:

A) Their having completed primary, middle or high school or an institution of higher learning or

B) Their residency of at least 5 years intermittantly or 3 years consecutively or for the past 2 years.

Confirmation and Selection of Candidates from the Provinces

Article 7:

1. Application for candidacy shall be by petition to be given to the governors' offices. Attachment to this petition of the originals or certified copies of documents demonstrating existence of the conditions in paragraphs 3 and 4, a brief autobiography not to exceed one page and three identification photographs shall be necessary. Doucments lacking one part may be completed within the candidacy application period.

2. The governor shall evaluate the information concerning applicants who meet the conditions in articles 4 and 5 apply, obtained through personal contacts which he will make on as broad a scale as possible with members of the justice, security and various organizations and professional bodies within the provincial boundaries, and shall report to the NSC the full names of three times the number of members to be selected for the Consultative Assembly from that province from among the applicants judged to be well known and respected in the area.

3. Documents and petitions of provincial candidates shall be sent to the NSC in separate, sealed envelopes

4. The NSC shall select the Consultative Assembly members from among the candidates of that province.

Candidacy for Direct Selection by the NSC

Article 8:

Those desiring to be candidates for direct selection as member of the Consultative Assembly by the NSC shall submit their petitions to the NSC Secretariat General. Attachment to these applications of the originals or certified copies of documents demonstrating the existence of the conditions sought by the law, a brief autobiography not to exceed one page and three identification photographs shall be necessary.

Member Selection by the NSC

Article 9:

The NSC shall select members of the Consultative Assembly in accordance with this law.

Notification of Members Selected

Article 10:

The full names and occupations of Consultative Assembly members selected directly or from among provincial candidates by the NSC shall be announced by means of the RESMI GAZETE and the Turkish Radio and TV Administration.

Selection for Vacancies

Article 11:

In the event of vacancies for any reason in the memberships selected in accordance with this law, the vacancies shall be filled by direct selection by the NSC.

Membership Safeguards

Article 12:

1. Consultative Assembly members shall act on behalf of the Turkish nation.

2. The duties of Consultative Assembly members may not be terminated for reasons other than loss of the membership qualifications shown in this law.

3. Those selected for the Consultative Assembly while employed in state or other public corporate bodies or affiliated agencies or organizations shall not have their employment terminated except by their own request. They shall be considered on leave without pay from their jobs. The periods during which they are on leave shall be added to account as active service for purposes of promotion and retirement, providing they pay into their pensions and the equivalent is paid from the Assembly budget.

Immunity

Article 13:

1. Consultative Assembly members shall not be held responsible for the views they express and the votes they exercise in the course of their duties in the assembly and shall serve as responsible only to their oaths and consciences.

2. Consultative Assembly members may not be examined as suspects, arrested or tried except by a simple majority decision of the full Consultative Assembly membership. However, being caught red-handed in the commission of a felony is excluded from this provision. In such cases, the competent authorities shall immediately report the incident to the Consultative Assembly chairmanship.

3. Implementation of a sentence of law rendered concerning a Consultative Assembly member before or after selection shall be postponed until such time as the legal existence of the Assembly shall be terminated. The statute of limitations does not apply in this instance.

Jobs Compatible With Membership

Article 14:

Consultative Assembly members may continue their professional activities under the proviso that these do not impede their duties in the general session and committees of the Consultative Assembly.

Jobs Incompatible With Membership

Article 15:

Those selected for membership of the Consultative Assembly may not take jobs in state and other public corporate bodies or affiliated agencies and organizations or in enterprises and partnerships in which state and other public corporate bodies are directly or indirectly involved and concerned, accept directly or indirectly any contract job pertaining to them, or perform the task of representative, arbitrator or agent in disagreement to which they are party.

Termination of Membership

Article 16:

1. Membership of anyone who resigns or is convicted of or under restraint for a crime prohibiting selection for the Consultative Assembly shall terminate without need of any further decision.

2. A decision to terminate membership shall be rendered by the Consultative Assembly in general session in the case of those who are absent without due cause for a period of a total of 5 days within 1 month from Consultative Assembly general and committee sessions.

3. A decision to terminate membership shall be rendered by the Consultative Assembly in general session concerning members who accept any of the jobs stated in Article 15 of this law.

Salary and Allowances

Article 17:

1. Those selected for the Consultative Assembly shall be paid a grade-1, top step civil service salary and an allowance at a rate totaling 100 percent of that salary computed with a supplemental indicator of 900.

2. Salaries and allowances to be paid those selected for the Consultative Assembly shall not require termination of retirement pensions and similar payments being made to them by the social security organizations.

3. Those selected for the Consultative Assembly shall enjoy the other social rights applicable to members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

First Meeting of the Consultative Assembly

Article 18:

At the first meeting of the Consultative Assembly, the eldest member shall serve as chairman and the two youngest members as secretaries.

Swearing In

Article 19:

Those selected for the Consultative Assembly shall, upon assuming their duties, take the following oath, in alphabetical order by surname:

"I swear upon my name and honor that in my work as a member of the Consultative Assembly I shall preserve the existence and independence of the state and the integrity and indivisibility of the nation and the people; I shall not swerve from the ideal of universal access to human rights and the fundamental freedoms within the understanding of public tranquillity, national solidarity and social justice; and I shall remain faithful to the principles of a democratic and secular republic to ensure the supremacy of the law."

Chairmanship Staff

Article 20:

The Consultative Assembly shall select during its second meeting a chairmanship staff to consist of a chairman, two vice chairmen, four secretaries and two administration officers.

Standing Orders, Committees and Policing

Article 21:

1. The Consultative Assembly shall conduct its affairs according to the rules of standing orders it devises.

2. The Consultative Assembly shall select no later then 1 month after its first meeting a constitutional committee to consist of 15 members.

3. The permanent committees of the Consultative Assembly and the selection of members to the committees shall be set forth in the standing orders. Temporary and joint committees shall be formed as needed.

4. The committees shall be able to summon to the committee and hear anyone whose knowledge and experience they wish to draw upon and may receive written views from public administrations and organizations and professional administrations and organizations.

5. The Consultative Assembly shall police itself through the chairman.

Discussions

Article 22:

1. The Consultative Assembly general sessions shall be open to the public and committee sessions shall be closed.

2. The Consultative Assembly may decide to hold closed session by a simple majority of the full membership.

3. Open general sessions of the Consultative Assembly shall be published in the journal of proceedings.

Quorum for Meeting and Resolution

Article 23:

The Consultative Assembly shall convene with a simple majority of the full membership and pass resolutions with a simple majority of those present, barring any regulations to the contrary.

Lawmaking

Authority to Propose Laws

Article 24:

1. Authority to propose laws shall reside in the members of the NSC, the Council of Ministers and the members of the Consultative Assembly.

2. Bills proposed by Consultative Assembly members shall require the signatures of at least 10 members.

3. Bills shall be presented to the Consultative Assembly chair.

Debate and Passage of Laws

Article 25:

1. Bills sent from the government and members' bills shall be discussed first in the relevant committee or committees and then in general session. Draft laws and proposals accepted verbatim or as amended or rejected shall be forwarded to the NSC.

2. In the discussion of draft laws and proposals in the Consultative Assembly committees and general session, the presence shall be necessary of the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned or a designated official and of at least one of the proposing Consultative Assembly members, or if the proposal is made by an NSC member, of a designated official from the NSC Secretariat General.

3. The NSC may accept verbatim, amend or reject draft laws and proposals from the Consultative Assembly. The text approved by the NSC shall be enacted by publication in the RESMI GAZETE.

Acceptance, Submission to the Public and Finalization of the Constitution

Article 26:

1. The text of the Constitution drafted by the Constitution Committee of the Consultative Assembly and approved in general session shall be accepted verbatim or amended by the NSC and published in the RESMI GAZETE.

2. The Constitution accepted by the NSC shall be submitted to referendum according to provisions of the law on submission to the public.

3. The Constitution accepted by referendum shall be final.

Budget Submission

Article 27:

A report showing general and mixed budget drafts and national budget estimations shall be submitted to the Consultative Assembly by the Council of Ministers at least 3 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.

Budget Debate

Article 28:

1. The Consultative Assembly shall complete budget hearings within 2 months according to standing order provisions.

2. Budget drafts approved by the Budget Committee shall be debated and adopted by the Consultative Assembly in general session and forwarded to the NSC.

3. Members shall not propose in Consultative Assembly general sessions increased spending or reductions of specific revenues.

4. Drafts originating in the Consultative Assembly shall be final in the form approved by the NSC and shall enter into effect by publication in the RESMI GAZETE prior to the first of the fiscal year.

Various Regulations

Consultative Assembly Formation and Related Terms

Article 29:

According to this law, opening and closing dates for application for candidacy and for candidates to be reported to the NSC and the date on which the Consultative Assembly shall initially convene shall be appointed by the NSC and announcement shall be made in the RESMI GAZETE and by means of the Turkish Radio and TV Administration.

Crimes Committed against the Consultative Assembly and Its Members

Article 30:

1. Those who commit crimes against the Consultative Assembly shall be sentenced under the Turkish Penal Code as applicable to crimes committed against the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

2. In crimes committed against Consultative Assembly members, the provisions of the Turkish Penal Code pertaining to members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall apply.

Quota Candidacy Disallowed

Article 31:

Constituent Assembly members may not stand as quota candidates for any political party in the first general elections.

Marginal Headings

Article 32:

Marginal headings of articles of this law have been inserted for the purpose of indicating major content of the articles' provisions and are not a part of the text.

Provisional Article

Draft laws and proposals now in NSC committee shall be forwarded to the office of the chairman of the Consultative Assembly by the office of the chairman of the NSC upon election of the Consultative Assembly Chairmanship Staff and its assumption of duty. However, draft laws and proposals on the NSC agenda shall continue under discussion.

Validity

Article 33:

This law shall enter into effect on the date of publication.

Distribution of Members by Province

The Constituent Assembly Law states that Istanbul shall send nine [as published] members to the Consultative Assembly; Ankara, eight; Izmir, five; Adana and Konya, four each. According to the law, Bursa, Samsun and Zonguldak will each have three members in the Consultative Assembly. The following provinces will each have two members in the Consultative Assembly:

--Afyon, Antalya, Aydin, Balikesir, Corum, Denizli, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Hatay, Icel, Kars, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Malatya, Manisa, Kahramanmaras, Ordu, Sivas, Tokat, Trabzon, Urfa.

Provinces which will have one member each in the Consultative Assembly are listed as follows:

--Adiyaman, Agri, Amasya, Artvin, Bilecik, Bingol, Bolu, Burdur, Canakkale, Cankiri, Edirne, Elazig, Erzincan, Eskisehir, Giresun, Gumushane, Hakkari, Isparta, Kastamonu, Kirklareli, Kirsehir, Kutahya, Mardin, Mugla, Mus, Nevsehir, Nigde, Rize, Sakarya, Siirt, Sinop, Tekirdag, Tunceli, Usak, Van, Yozgat.

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U.S. CALLED 'ESSENTIAL ALLY' OF TURKEY, EUROPE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11 Jun 81 pp 1, 14

[Article by Nazli Ilicak: "Russia-USA -- Communism-Capitalism"]

[Text] You may think of balanced expressions such as "America, no; Russia, no" and "Down with communism, down with capitalism" primarily as the manifestation of a moderate policy. By extension, this policy means splitting from NATO, throwing the "slave makers' bases" (!) off our soil and opposing the neutron bomb and Pershing and Cruise missiles. Those who defend the above views believe that they are putting on a front of "complete independence," but actually most of them are pushing their true goal -- communism -- under such a guise.

The United States is an essential ally for Turkish and European defense. So much so that if the United States wanted to withdraw to its perimeter or attempted to pull its troops out of Europe, every Western nation, including the Netherlands and Belgium which hesitate to allow Cruise and Pershing missiles on their soil today, would be thrown into chaos. Greece's efforts to return to NATO after having pulled out are still in memory. However, the reverse is true for Russia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were unable to leave the Warsaw Pact and the communist system. Now Poland is in the same position and Solidarity's efforts to take command of workers in the "workers' state" are being watched anxiously by Moscow. The Polish Communist Party receives frequent warnings.

If Turkey were a South American nation, it would perhaps be justified in feeling more irritable toward the United States. But next to the Soviet Union, it is not the least bit realistic, if not always intentional, to shy away still from "American imperialism."

The Pershing and Cruise missile controversy has flared up in recent weeks. These missiles would be placed in Italy, Britain and Germany (476 each) and the Netherlands and Belgium (96 each) to balance the Soviets' triple warhead SS-20 type missiles. Although it does not concern Turkey directly, it is interesting and informative from the standpoint of showing how the Soviets hold the ruling powers in democratic countries in thrall. Schmidt is trying to satisfy the left wing of his party and Belgium and the Netherlands become more hesitant and unwilling every day. This is how Russia may be able to halt U.S. manufacture of the neutron bomb.

In setting its foreign policy, Turkey should always bear in mind its geographical location and the goals of communist ideology. It should be very sure of the true purpose behind the "peace-loving and independence" advocacy.

In whose interest is it to fan the flames of the Armenian cause, which was dashed in 1915? Who does it suit to have Turkey divided and partitioned? Who stockpiled thousands of weapons in our country from rocket launchers to Kalashnikov and automatic rifles; which state was hopefully waiting for a civil war? Who directed the broadcast of such provocative and incendiary programs as "Bizim Radio" and the "Voice of the TCP [Turkish Communist Party]"? Look at what was broadcast on 7 May on the "Voice of the TCP": "6 May 1972 is a day of mourning for all progressive patriots in our country. On this dark day, Deniz Gezmis, Huseyin Inan and Yusuf Aslan were executed at a time when the 12 March regime loomed over our nation like a nightmare. Turkey has not forgotten these patriotic progressive youths who fought against American imperialism with the cry, 'We serve our people though we die.' They remember them in the flames of war conducted for the happiness and independence of our people."

It is wrong to put the United States on the same scales with a Soviet Union which interferes in Africa and South America by means of nations like Libya and Cuba and which tries to destroy countries from within. At least the pressure on the government of the American people, who believe in democracy, should be considered a sufficient guarantee. In fact, the United States withdrew from Vietnam for this reason. According to a TIME study, although 73 percent of the American people want their country to be the number one military power in the world, they oppose intervention of any kind in South America.

The proliferation of threats raises false anxieties and hides the true danger. Certainly we do not want to steer a course in America's wake, but we will carry out the requirements of common defense and alliance. Our relations with the United States under the European umbrella are balanced anyway. We have a foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arab nations divergent from the United States. But to come out in addition to this with slogans like "USA, no; Russia, no" and to be always comparing the "two imperialisms" will lead us to the wrong conclusions and adoption of wrong positions. This is exactly like saying, "Communism is evil," and then pummelling capitalism too. However, capitalism has survived the evil and excesses of the 19th century to create prosperous countries in the 20th century. France's Socialist President Mitterand has raised the minimum wage to 2,900 francs per month, taking advantage of the wealth created by capitalism. According to Mitterand's program, workers will work 35 hours per week, have 5 weeks vacation each year and make at least 2,900 francs (approximately 50,000 Turkish liras) per month.

Now let us move on to the workers in Poland and take a look at the problem there. Do they want communism, or capitalism?

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'MILLIYET' WRITER EXAMINES ROLE OF MILITARY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 11 Jun 81 p 8

[Article by Teoman Erel in the column "Telex": "General Atmosphere"]

[Text] The statements at every opportunity by the most authoritative spokesmen of the administration that Turkey will return to democracy have nothing to do with trying to make themselves popular. It is the expression of a preference. They believe that democracy is the "best" or "least evil" form of form of government for Turkey.

We civilians ought not to let prejudice lead us into thinking that the uniform is incompatible with logic and compassion. Our Armed Forces have a special difference. Military College graduates have made a significant showing among the most respected and successful political leaders in our recent history. Ataturk and Inonu changed the destiny of our nation. Cemal Gursel and Fahri Koruturk stood for good will, common sense and logic.

All of these respected, beloved men have believed that the will of the nation is basic to the governing of Turkey and have acted on their beliefs.

While the basic duty of the Turkish army from one aspect is national defense, from another aspect it is also our military which says most effectively that personal administration of the nation is neither a good nor lasting method.

Mustafa Kemal, when the Ottoman Empire was collapsing, passionately opposed Enver Pasha and the trend represented by the Committee of Union. He defended the need to separate the military and politics.

When the flames of the War for Independence were dying down, Mustafa Kemal still held to the same principle and did what had to be done.

This principle is not just for show and neither is it a luxury for Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces, but a necessity. The Turkish army is not a frill for Turkey. A strong and active army is a possession which we need at all times and cannot do without.

Developments south of the border show once more that our army must stand ready at any moment. One wonders what would have happened in the adventurer Nikos Sampson's coup on Cyprus in 1974 had the Turkish army not been able to perform its duty. Even though the Turkish army once more proved its strength on that date, how much would the boldness and influence of those who still attempt to get things out of Turkey have grown?

Certainly it was irresponsible persons in Israel who boasted about the raid on Iraq: They said the range of their aircraft extended from Ethiopia to Ankara. It is not necessary to take issue with this uncalled-for statement. But the obligation is clear from the standpoint of national security for us to be prepared at all times and against all eventualities.

The precept that the Turkish army is unlike South American armies is based on more than moral reasons. The concrete difference between South American armies and the Turkish army is that the Turkish army is always up on the foreigh threats which require its awareness of its basic duty and is always careful to avoid the identity of a "means of power" as in South America, because the region in which we live has been a bellicose region throughout history.

Our commanders consider military administration of the nation only in the face of extraordinary dangers and think of military administration not as a lasting advantage, but as a "temporary obligation."

Their failure to use the severity of military administrations as a lasting method of government and their making it seem at times like democracy have to do with the "temporary" feature.

A South American dictator determined to last has to be consistently harsh. Because he allows no hope of freedom, he fears the people. That ever more severe administrations find it difficult to leave power is not important for a South American general because he does not want to leave power anyway.

The wise commander, like ours, however says, "Let us not go too far; let us not make it difficult to return."

This is why, although it seems necessary at times to remind ourselves that "albeit temporary, this is a military administration," even though restrictions and prohibitions increase at times, softening follows.

From this standpoint, no one should get bogged down in pessimism. For example, why should the constituent assembly not be more "representative" than thought?

Why should an "atmosphere of debate" not develop toward productive freedom again?

Is it not possible that the restriction on expressing opinions about the future system which includes all party members might not be reduced a little earlier than thought?

Despite some pessimistic estimates about the date for elections which will restore democracy to Turkey such as the one "as long as 1985" in the foreign press, why should early 1983 or even the end of 1982 not be just as likely?

Is it too optimistic if we continue to think that it was an indication that future standards will be kept realistic when Head of State Kenan Evren said in a statement to the foreign press not long ago that the number of former parliamentarians which it was thought should not enter the new parliament should be limited to the "leaders and administrative cadres"?

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STATUS, TRAINING OF MILITARY RESERVES VIEWED IN DETAIL

Paris RESERVE & DEFENSE in French Dec 80 pp 7-10, 16-20, 30-43

[Excerpts] [I] The Place of the Reserves in the French Defense Concept

Nuclear weapons systems and increasingly sophisticated conventional weapons systems have led to the decline of mass armies because of the cost of those systems as well as the revolution they have brought about in operational technique and in the structures of armed forces. At the same time there is an ever more pronounced need to have forces constantly available which are ready to go into action on extremely short notice and to have other forces available raised onto a war footing in very short time frames; this is necessary in order to provide the capacity for retaliation intervention and security in time of crisis, capacity which the national strategy requires. That is what has led to the abandonment of the process which applied more particularly to the army of 1914 and to an even greater extent to the army of 1939, the process by which huge armies were formed under the umbrella created by peacetime forces by mobilizing the extensive resources drawn from the reserves around core groups of regulars.

But even though we are no longer in the age of the big battalions, military reserves in the broad sense of the term, which also includes inactive reserves, still play a very important role in our defense system, particularly in the army.

Firstly, the presence of the reserves in our armed forces attests to the determination of all citizens without distinction as to social origin or political opinions to defend the nation, and therefore it is evidence of the commitment of the nation's vital forces. But the reserves are also essential to the actual functioning of our armed forces system. When our armed forces are actually brought onto a war footing, the reserves account for 24 percent of the manpower in the navy, 42 percent in the air force, and 47 percent in the army. They also make up 10 percent of the manpower used by the nuclear forces. The 15 regular army divisions themselves need an additional 15 percent in order to be at full strength. The reserves make up 24 percent in the self-contained army corps units and 72 percent of service units, the Medical Service corps in particular. The reserves amount to 62 percent of materiel support units. So without the reserves our field forces would be without their logistics and therefore without any capability to carry out long term combat. Finally, the reserves make up the main part (80 percent) of the 14 reserve divisions as well as of the general reserves and in particular of the hundred or so territorial regiments which carry out Territorial Operational Defense static missions.

Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that without the reserves our defense is not fully functional. That is the reason for concern about their effectiveness and for the effort which has been undertaken to reorganize them and resolve certain problems which they present.

Role of Reserve Cadres

The role of reserve cadres is particularly important.

The armed forces need reserve cadres more than ever, both during their term of military service in order to supplement the number of cadres in units during peacetime, and in order to keep the reserves supplied in anticipation of mobilization. It would be detrimental to the armed forces for them to be deprived of resources which allow the body of regular cadres to be reinforced and supplemented at a time when changed combat conditions require a greater number and high quality of cadres.

Reserve cadres, officers and non-commissioned officers, are also an incomparable link between the armed forces, which they are well acquainted with, and the nation at large which their various occupations allow them to enter into every day. Thus, reserve cadres, via patient and persistent activity in the area of morale, are in all respects the most suitable people to make the country understand the necessity for military institutions and national defense.

When they are on active service they have the same rights, and of course the same duties, as regular cadres. At the side of the regulars, reservists handle command or management or the running of units and formations of the armed forces and affiliated services. When reservists are posted in accordance with the code of national service in defense assignments which are outside the armed forces they do not lose their officer or NCO status.

The Role of the Army Reserves

Since 1975 the goal of activity which started up in the army is to make it possible for the reserves and their body of cadres to effectively handle the role in our defense which falls to them.

That is why a coherent body of reforms has been set up to:

- adapt mobilization to fit the role if is assigned, and to improve instruction and training conditions from the standpoint of both personnel and equipment;

- closely involve reserve cadres in the preparation, organization and execution of the mobilization of units for which they provide the command structure; and, finally,

- redefine the conditions of their recruitment and training.

The sole objective of the new organization is military effectiveness via putting together units of a standard type which are completely operational and capable of confronting diverse situations and providing mutual reinforcement. The most important characteristics of these units will be versatility and mobility. By means of this reform the army forms one whole. It is made up of 15 regular divisions, 13 of which cover the entire metropolitan territory. The territory's operational defense is not,

as was previously the case, handled solely by static forces mainly oriented towards protecting vulnerable points, but can be handled with whatever amount of resources the situation will require by all of our forces. Conversely, while troop missions on the borders will continue to be led by mechanized troops from the field forces, these mechanized troops could be reinforced by elements from units in the interior whose troops and weapons will not be inferior to the units they would come to support. This reorganization of the army has restructured forces on a divisional basis. The elimination of the brigade level has permitted new geographical deployment of the large units and has eliminated the distinction between operational forces and territorial forces which entailed a double command structure. This has important consequences for the reserves. In effect, the reserves are not meant to be considered as separate, nor are they meant to be treated in any specifically different way. Their role, missions and structures are necessarily tied to the role, missions and structures of regular units. The new mobilization plan follows from that.

The Role of the Navy Reserves

This role is two-fold. It consists of:

- on the one hand, making a significant back-up contribution to the navy's operational capability in time of crisis; and,

- on the other hand, effectively participating in spreading defense consciousness in the country, and promoting the nation's maritime interests.

Reinforcing the Navy in Time of Crisis

If one were to look at the regular navy at work from day to day one might at first have the impression that it operated at full capability in peacetime and that therefore it does not need reservists. All ships are well equipped with practically full complements and so they do not expect much in the way of reinforcements from mobilization. The navy maintains a constant presence in all oceans. Consequently its communications, its logistical organization and its PC [command post] operations operate everywhere.

Nevertheless, if one looks more closely, one sees that reinforcements are necessary:

- to permit the navy to "last" during a prolonged crisis at a maximum level of effort; and

- to handle specific crisis period missions, in particular:

  --the organization and protection of maritime traffic, an element essential to the nation's survival; and

  --the defense of our land installations against enemy attacks.

The result of this is that at the present time mobilization has the following characteristics:

- numbers are relatively small;

- sea duty involves a small proportion; and, on the other hand,

- the great majority would be in staffs and PC operations, logistical support groups, and, most of all, units for defending the navy's vulnerable points.

At first sight the role of reservists might seem modest. However, it is absolutely essential for a navy effort in a prolonged crisis.

The Role of Air Force Reserves

Given the specific nature of the air force, it has its own doctrine in the area of mobilization.

In fact, in order to carry out its two essential missions, which are

- air security, and

- nuclear deterrence,

the air force must, as soon as international tension appears, be able to immediately go from peacetime operation to wartime operation. Its regular troop strength has been calculated to give it this capability.

But this wartime operation translates into an increased number of missions, an increased number of crews on alert, etc. This entails a sizable increase in responsibilities for flying units, control units, technical units, support units, etc. If the state of alert, with the extra load it involves, is maintained for a prolonged period, it becomes necessary to provide reinforcements for all these units.

Besides, security for installations in peacetime does not require a very great number of personnel. But in time of crisis it becomes necessary to reinforce this security to a considerably extent against the two-fold risk of air attacks and land attacks (acts of sabotage, commando actions, etc.).

From these two notional ideas -- an increased activity rate to be supported over a prolonged period of time, and reinforcing security -- it follows that the two main areas for using reservists are:

--reinforcing the various units with qualified and rapidly available reservists; and

--establishing, or providing substantial reinforcement for, security units; surveillance, additional security measures, anti-aircraft artillery, etc.

At one can say that while there exist technical limits to the use of air force reservists, their usefulness is not open to question. There is of course a very limited number of flight personnel -- pilots and air territory section observers -- within the reserves, and a much greater number of non-flight personnel. The latter have many functions to perform in communications, command posts, operational units, support agencies and, most of all, security units. Therefore, in the event of mobilization the reserves provide the air force with the extra contribution necessary to fill out its formations, to conduct redeployments in the environment which

is essential, and to reinforce the security of its ground installations. The air force's call-up objective is one-third of its reserve personnel each year. The training given out is mainly in three complementary areas: base defense, surveillance, and setting up anti-aircraft artillery.

Finally, just as in the other armed forces the whole body of reservists, whether assigned to duty or not, participates in spreading the spirit of defense and spreading air force consciousness in the nation.

The Role of Reserves in the Gendarmerie

Like the army, the Gendarmerie looks to the derivation system for the manpower levels which mobilization is meant to allow it to reach. The Gendarmerie's mobilization plan doubles its peacetime strength. The Gendarmerie's presence all over the country is of capital importance in time of crisis. The participation of reserve personnel in this mission is one of the most concrete efforts they make in the defense establishment.

In the event of mobilization, the Gendarmerie maintains its general peacetime organization but adds to its size. It starts doing that by reinforcing staffs and existing territorial units. It also sets up derived units (derived squadrons and tactical Mobile Guard staffs, intelligence squads, border squads, and department-level Gendarmerie traffic squads).

The Role of Medical Corps Reserves

To successfully carry out the different missions which devolve on the medical corps in time of crisis and of war, that corps has reserve cadres who participate jointly with regular military cadres in the leadership structures of military formations in the various armed forces, which thereby increases the size of the medical corps.

Medical corps reserve officers, medical doctors in particular, would in the event of military conflict come to reinforce and fill out the ranks of career officers. The number called up would be greater than peacetime strength, and a greater number of doctors would be required. Because of the power of modern weapons to inflict injury there would be a greater and more serious incidence of medical trauma. In order to prepare to cope with the flood of victims, the medical corps would increase its hospital beds by a factor of slightly more than five.

To bring this increased hospitalization capacity into play, medical corps personnel themselves would also have to be increased in approximately the same proportions. We are talking here about a special burden for the medical corps since under mobilization none of the armed forces or service corps has to appeal for that kind of "force increase." This increase can only be achieved with the help of reserve doctors who make up 12.5 percent of the total strength of the medical corps in wartime.

In wartime the number of losses would make it necessary to call up a large number of surgeons, anaesthesiologists and emergency medicine physicians. Of course it is unthinkable to maintain the number of personnel in these specialties on regular active peacetime service which corresponds to wartime needs. It falls to the reserves to supply the necessary back-up. In time of crisis, eight to nine percent of

the total number of civilian doctors would come to assist the regular medical corps personnel in fulfilling their mission.

The Draft, the Basis of the Reserves System

The importance of the reserves in all units, even units of regulars, is the result of a deliberate choice to look to the draft to insure the availability of military forces which are not made up solely of professional military men. In actual fact, the necessary troop strength cannot be reached without requiring conscription.

It is technically impossible to recruit committed volunteers of sufficient number and at a high enough level because having our troop strength depend on economic circumstances is out of the question. An army of that kind would in any event, be beyond our financial capabilities. Only the draft makes the availability of trained reserves in sufficient numbers possible. In fact, inactive reserve and reserve personnel will be chosen starting with the young people who have completed military service.

[II] The Mobilization System

The Derivation System in the Army

Until the last world war it was assumed that a threat to us French could only come from the northeast, the historical gateway for invasions. To meet a threat we used to put millions of men on that border whose mission was to hold on to that territory.

Nowadays, on the contrary, a threat can appear suddenly at any place in our territory and take the most widely varying forms; however, the nuclear weapons with which we are endowed give us such power that it is pointless to set up vast numbers of divisions. The army's only needs are those necessary for "general coverage" and for testing the enemy's will.

So the size of our army after mobilization is eight times less than what it was in 1940, and the proportion of the working population which would in actual fact be called up to get back in uniform would not get up to 2 percent, whereas it was 25 percent in 1940.

However, to meet the new forseeable threats it is essential that reserve formations be strong, mobile, and very rapidly operational. It is to satisfy these imperative needs that a new mobilization plan has been established in the general framework of the army's reorganization.

The Features of the Mobilization Plan

The main characteristic of the new plan is that most of the mobilized formations are regrouped into large units. The new plan is also different from its predecessor in that there is a generalized implementation of the principle of derivation and greater flexibility in the plan's use.

Regrouping Into Large Units

At the end of the mobilization process in this mobilization plan, the 15 regular army divisions which made up the Field Forces in peacetime are reinforced by 14 large reserve units:

- 10 reserve infantry divisions each grouping together three infantry regiments, one light armored cavalry regiment, one company of engineers, and command and support resources; and

- 4 divisions from the military schools.

These mobile reserve divisions are well equipped and have heavy firepower at their disposal, particularly for anti-tank combat: they are capable of rapidly confronting any threat.

The Principle of Derivation

These mobilized divisions will be set up via "derivation" from a regular army division.

"Derivation" is the process which for a regular army formation consists of:

- preparing the mobilization of a reserve formation at its same level by stockpiling materiel and organizing personnel for it;

- providing it with personnel by making up a local pool or reservists from men called up who have completed their active service in its ranks and reinforcing it with regular army cadres and troops who make up what could be properly called the "regular army core" of the reserve units; and

- providing support for its training.

Thus a regular army division mobilizes a reserve division just as each regiment is the source of a derived regiment.

A reserve division is under the command of the general officer who is the deputy of the general commanding the regular division, but regiments are normally commanded by reserve officers.

This implementation of the principle of derivation has made it possible to ease the burdens of mobilization and has made for better cohesion of units.

The burdens are eased via an appreciable reduction in mobilized troops but also via better territorial distribution and the elimination of certain mobilizing centers. Each regular army regiment becomes, in effect, the mobilizing agency for its derived regiment.

There is better cohesion of units because most personnel know each other from peacetime. In addition, since the average length of time personnel are assigned is 3 years after the end of their regular service, they should still be very highly qualified. Finally, although the parent unit's commander is certainly responsible for mobilization preparation, reserve cadres are directly included in those preparations: the work carried out together is beneficial for the morale of the derived unit.

A Greater Flexibility in Its Use

The final characteristic of the new mobilization plan is the flexibility in the plan's use gained by a better definition of the different stages of mobilization.

The plan is based on the idea that armed confrontation would mark the high point of the aggravation of an international crisis. Classification by "stages" allows for increases in troop strength to be adapted to an evolving crisis and for army troop strength to double in less than a week if necessary.

The Troop Numbers

The plan shows an overall total of 545,000 men who are divided up as follows:

- regular army: 264,000

- reserve: 281,000

These troop numbers do not include personnel who have not gone through training and those who are stationed overseas.

The numbers of troops to be called up needed to carry out this plan, including supplementary recalls, are broken down into:

- 26,000 reserve officers

- 52,500 reserve NCO's

- 245,000 other enlisted men

In a state of mobilization the army represents in total:

- 1 army with its components (EOA [Self-contained Elements of the Army]);

- 3 army groups with their components (EOCA [Self-contained Army Corps Elements]);

- 15 regular army divisions, 8 of them armored and 7 infantry; and

- 14 mobilization divisions: 10 reserve divisions derived from regular army divisions, and 4 from military schools.

The General Reserve and Divisional Regiments

The mobilization system does not limit itself to the derivation process. That process represents a third of the plan. There are also general reserve regiments and divisional regiments which are sponsored and set up by mobilizing centers.

Selective Recalls Into the Navy

For the navy, reservists are a major asset because of both their numbers and their quality. The number of reservists "on the books" amounts to 160,000. They are broken down into 14,000 officers, 40,000 petty officers, and 106,000 leading seamen and other enlisted below petty officer rank.

The principal mission of the reserves is to contribute to the country's military defense by swelling the ranks of the regular navy in the event of hostilities.

In the course of the last few years the concept of mobilization has come a long way in order to adapt itself to the concept of strategic deterrence: the atomic age has replaced the age of the "big battalions." The whole conception of peace and war is finely shaded and covers an entire range. Nowadays, deterrence puts a strategic "freeze" on the territories of the nuclear powers but as an indirect consequence it gives rise almost anywhere in the world to crisis situations somewhere between genuine peace and open warfare, crisis situations characterized by more or less high degrees of tension. In order to bring these crises under control and not be toyed with by the enemy, one must be able to react with vigor, flexibility and speed to the various situations which present themselves. Therefore the navy must have at its disposal naval aviation forces available at any moment, without waiting for mobilization, which means those forces must be supplied with regular navy personnel at almost full complement.

The military capabilities of modern ships and combat planes are constantly increasing (firepower, firing accuracy, informational devices). But this improvement in performance data means an increase in costs and a decrea e in manpower aboard ships.

Therefore a new navy mobilization plan was set up in 1976. This plan is characterized by:

- a more limited number of mobilized reservists;

- the high percentage of personnel assigned to shore units (staffs, logistical support, security units); and

- the flexibility brought into call-up methods in order to be able to adapt manpower strength to actual needs according to the situation's degree of tension.

The effectiveness of the contribution of the reserve to the navy's war effort presupposes that mobilized personnel are well matched with, instructed in, and trained for their jobs. Three criteria have been established for choosing reservists receiving a mobilization billet:

- basic qualifications (technical or operational competence, age);

- voluntary military service; and

- the proximity of one's place of residence to the mobilization billet.

Mobilization Organization

The goal of the mobilization organization is to have an appropriate number of qualified reservists available at any time during a crisis. So there is on the one hand a problem of manpower and on the other hand a problem of skills.

The total number of men available for mobilization is a modest one. In addition, a flexible recall system has been set up in order to recall only reservists the navy needs.

The current situation is based in effect on the notion of a more or less permanent an[illegible] or less serious crisis as opposed to the Manichaean peace-war concept which

formerly prevailed. If not enough reservists are recalled, the naval forces cannot operate effectively. There is a lack of output. If more reservists are recalled than the situation requires, the nation's economic and productive efforts become unnecessarily disorganized. For this reason a system of selective recalls was adopted. It calls for a serious disciplined effort on the part of reservists to commit themselves to turning up with the prescribed time period lest mobilization arrangements become disorganized.

Responsibilities in the mobilization area are organized in the following way:

On the national level:

Navy Staff Headquarters (Division Plans) sets up the mobilization plan, in particular the listing by unit of billets to be filled (number, grade, specialty).

The admiral who heads Naval Personnel designates the personnel assigned to these billets (a regular designee and a substitute for each officer and senior petty officer billet, and one regular designee per billet plus an overall supplementary pool of 30 percent extra for other assignments).

The head of personnel has two deputies in this area:

- a flag officer responsible for reserve training (DPMM/IRAM) who assigns officer personnel; and

- a deputy director, a civilian administrator responsible for the administration of the reserves, who assigns non-officer personnel (the agency tasked with this work is the Toulon BMM/CGR).

On the regional level:

The naval authorities responsible for implementing the mobilization plan (the PREMAR's, or Port Commands; COMAR PARIS, the Paris Navy Command; and the overseas COMAR's or Navy Commands) have Navy Mobilizing Centers (CMM) available which have been set up in Cherbourg, Brest, Toulon and Paris as well as in the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories]. The mission of these centers, which are commanded by high-level regular navy officers, is to organize the call-up of mobilized reservists and organize their transportion to their assigned units.

The Roles of the Different Command Levels in the Air Force

One of the air force's principal characteristics is its capability to be engaged with all its resources mustered in any conflict whatever within a few minutes or a few hours depending on the particular case. Therefore, it might seem paradoxical for the air force to make much effort to emphasize the role of reservists in its mobilization system.

Within the present defense concept, properly trained reservists contribute valuable reinforcement to the regular forces, and they play an important role in the implementation of crisis plans and base protection. Neither should one forget that they make up an indispensable link strengthening the ties between regular service personnel and the nation at large.

In order to implement mobilization policy, a flexible and decentralized mobilization organization has been in use since 1964. An actual "reserve mobilization" arrangement of functional responsibilities has been set up. It starts off with the air force chief of staff and ends up at the specific air base and its units.

At the staff headquarters level the general serving as deputy chief of staff looks at problems as a whole and gives out general directives whose implementation he supervises. He is assisted in this by the deputies for operations and logistics and he is in close contact with the inspector general of the reserves. A "mobilization" committee takes care of coordinating the work of the various staff offices.

Department Three sets out mobilization doctrine and specifies the conditions for use and training of reservists. It also manages "reserve" funds.

Department One and Department Four and the "Communications" Department organize the mobilization and lay out the directives regarding the situating, management, administration and preparation of personnel and materiel.

Finally, the cohsultative committee of reserve cadres makes the broad policy outlines being followed by staff headquarters known to reservist associations. This greatly facilitates dialogue and makes fruitful exchanges of views possible.

Preparation for mobilizing forces and services is decentralized. It is handled on the high operational command and high regional command level.

These commands are also in charge of readiness of reservists, NCO promotions and logistical operations of the reserves, according to the needs expressed by the forces, services and installations based in their territory.

The base commander's main role is to centralize and coordinate the needs of the units placed under his command. He is also meant to supervise the training of reservists. Unit commanders are responsible for providing that training. The base commander is also meant to stimulate the activity of reservists by facilitating the activity of the Reserve Air Centers for Advanced Training and Information (CAPIR) and of the "Active Reserve" Office (BAR).

Reinforcement of the Gendarmerie

In order to set up its wartime plan of action, the Gendarmerie calls on:

- on the one hand, its own reserves (former career officers and NCO's in the Gendarmerie, and former gendarme auxiliaries); and,

- on the other hand, army reserve personnel (officer, NCO's and other enlisted men).

Gendarmerie auxiliaries with a mobilization assignment in the Gendarmerie provide support in all circumstances and in all locations to Gendarmerie officers and NCO's.

They are representatives of the authorities responsible for public order. In Gendarmerie units at the department level auxiliaries are involved in special service, as reinforcement for patrols, going on rounds, station work, and in escort or transfer

services. Subject to meeting the necessary skill requirements, they are able to hold jobs as a driver, radio operator, and secretary. In Mobile Guard units they are more specifically slotted to fill regular personnel vacancies in jobs not requiring a specific "Gendarmerie" qualification (driver, secretary, radio operator, courier, etc.).

The Role of the Gendarmerie in Mobilization

First of all, the Gendarmerie assumes extensive responsibilities regarding the administration of the reserves. On this account the Gendarmerie is one of the main collaborators of the Central Directorate for National Service. Among the numerous activities it carries out in this area are, among others:

- delivery of new orders to report or marching orders to reservists instructed to report for a drill period who have not returned to military authorities the acknowledgement of receipt of orders to report sent in the mail;

- investigation of drill period deferral requests presented by reservists and forwarding of files;

- action following up loss of National Service card;

- searching for reservists who are "nowhere to be found,"

- receiving, checking, and forwarding change of address or residence notifications;

- support for reservists likely to be discharged; and

- carrying out various and sundry investigations requested by military authorities (looking for addresses, various pieces of information).

Regarding mobilization per se, the Gendarmerie also plays a critical role. In this connection it is of irreplaceable assistance to the Central Directorate for National Service (in the implementation phase):

- it is in fact the Gendarmerie brigades which carry out delivery and replacement of the mobilization instructions attached to a reservist's booklet; also, in their offices they store orders to report and individual personnel recall orders, vehicle requisition orders, and posters for public notice of mobilization and requisitioning;

- furthermore, it is these brigades, reinforced by the contribution made by reservists, which when the time came would distribute the documents in their possession, according to a carefully worked-out procedure and in such a way that mobilization can be carried out in the best possible conditions.

[III] Training and Education

For reserve personnel individual training begins with active duty service if they did not attend any preparatory military training.

Ordinary enlisted men serving a short time in reserve units are utilized in the jobs that they held at the end of their service as per their professional capabilities.

Reserve officers and NCO's are kept up in their particular qualification after active service and in addition receive supplementary training.

The goal of collective training of reserve personnel is to make reserve units capable of setting themselves up and of fulfilling the operational missions that they would be likely to get. Collective training involves the entire body of personnel occupying a mobilization billet, and it therefore assumes the nature of an obligation. Nevertheless, collective training shall be aimed on a priority basis at personnel who volunteer and who are recognized as qualified.

Training in the Army

Reserve training makes up a whole. It includes:

- pre-training, which is to say preparatory training;

- training, which is received during active service; and

- advanced training, broken down into:

  individual training of cadres

  collective training of cadres and troops

  optional training

The goal of reserve training is to train a body of cadres of the requisite standard and to provide for collective training of reserve units; its effort is focused on the formations which go to make up large units.

Training During Military Service

The army which is set up during mobilization includes 550,000 men of which around 285,000 are reservists trained during active service and meant to fill our regular army units or to set up formations varying in size from divisions to companies.

- The Training of Cadres

Reserve officers and NCO's, the majority of whom are officer candidates and NCO's who had been drafted, receive a command position during their active service on a level corresponding to their rank. Since in this way they are part of the leadership structure of army units, they are starting in peacetime to exercise the responsibilities which would be theirs in time of mobilization. Selection is based on their volunteering and on recruitment.

Recruitment priority for officer candidates is for young people who have made the effort to attend Higher Military Preparatory Training (PMS) before being called up for active service. They are admitted after being tested for aptitude according to the number of places available, and they partic'pate in weekend meetings during the school year and in a three-week block of time during summer. According to the order in which they are ranked in the final exam they get to choose their branch of the army, and they receive the PMS diploma. Those with diplomas are admitted directly to the EOR [reserve officer candidate] platoon of the Training School for their branch as soon as they are

inducted. They are formally named to the rank of officer candidate if they do satisfactorily on the final exam after four months of training, and they choose their assignment during a combined garrison briefing according to the order in which they graduate.

In addition to reserve officer candidates out of PMS, the army recruits reserve officer candidates from among a leadership-qualified group. This latter group must volunteer before induction, which usually means during their stopping at the selection center when they have been judged qualified. They are inducted into preparatory platoons organized in the schools and which last a month. After an exam, the best among them join the PMS candidates to go on with them to the EOR platoon subject to the limits imposed by the availability of places.

Since both the one group and the other can choose the date of their induction, it is very difficult for a leadership-qualified individual inducted in August or in October to get into the EOR platoon, since PMS has priority for places in it. That is why young people who did not manage to attend PMS but want to become reserve officers are advised to request they be called up at some other date.

At the end of their legal obligation, reserve officers can serve on active status. The army offers them renewable contracts of a 6-month minimum.

It is also possible for officer candidates to sign a short-term contract lasting four months and taking effect at the end of 12 months of military service. The goal of this arrangement is to get a return out of training officer candidates. In actual fact, a characteristic of the current system is how short a time period officer candidates are made use of.

NCO's who are called up are recruited from among corporals and senior corporals appointed at the disbanding of a platoon of NCO candidates after they have received their elementary professional military certificate. They can be appointed to the rank of cavalry or infantry sergeant starting after 6 months of service, provided that they show command aptitude and are qualified in the specialty attested to by the aptitude certificate issued by the commanding officer. In certain circumstances holders of military preparation certificates and candidates not admitted to the EOR's get a bonus of one month's seniority. New NCO's remain in their assigned corps.

After active service, reserve officers and NCO's provide leadership for mobilization units and can be awarded advancement which will depend on their training attendance.

Post-Service Training

Reserve training makes it possible to have units available which, when the need arises, are capable of setting themselves up and which can receive operational missions in shorter periods of time. This training is given in two forms:

- individual training, which involves officer and NCO cadres as well as certain other enlisted speicalists; and

- collective training, which involves all unit personnel.

Both one form and the other are compulsory and apply to personnel holding a mobilization assignment.

That does not mean that the army takes no further interest in non-assigned personnel. Optional training, on a volunteer basis, makes it possible for those personnel to keep in training and to maintain contact with the army.

- Individual Reserve Cadre Training

The aim of individual training is to improve step by step on the knowledge gained during active duty service as per increasingly complex jobs to be held.

Starting from 1 January 1981 individual reserve cadre training is being organized and implemented according to a new system. This system should make it possible to develop command capability, to bring the knowledge of personnel in the process of being assigned back up to standard, to get a return out of training, and to perfect the selection process. It is a matter of having reserve cadres acquire the technical and tactical knowledge and the ability to command which are essential for the successive jobs they will be given during their careers.

Organization of Individual Training

Reserve officers:

Technical and tactical knowledge is gained in the course of training periods in a school environment. Programs are closely tailored to the positions to be held. Command ability is developed either during the various top-to-bottom or selective training periods involving part or all of reserve units or during advanced training periods in regular army units.

Training periods in a school or training center are attended just before one takes up a command post or one with responsibility.

They are held for officers as follows:

- for platoon commanders: at the time of mobilization assignment (duration: 6 days);

- for basic unit commanders: in the year preceding promotion to the rank of captain (duration: 19 days); and

- for field grade officers: in the year preceding promotion to field grade (duration: 19 days).

Reserve NCO's:

For reserve NCO's, preparation for first and second degree military certificates is carried out during a 12-day training period, at the initiative and under the authority of region commanders. Mechnical training, which is given official recognition by 1st and 2d degree technical certificates, is given during 12-day specialization training periods in a school or training center. Elementary military certificates and elementary technical certificates are acquired during active service. Adding them to one's record gives one the elementary professional military certificate. No preparatory training is guaranteed in the reserves.

For reserve officers, and for reserve NCO's when they are platoon commanders assigned to combat and logistical units, advanced training completes the training acquired by them during the above-mentioned training periods. It is principally aimed at training reserve officers to command units effectively in the field which correspond to their rank. This training is given in the context of advanced training periods of 5 to 6 days in "parent" or "sponsor" regiments.

Personnel who are assigned or unassigned in agencies which do not have training sessions can keep up their training by taking part in Center for Prelimilitary and Reserve Training activities, particularly in shooting sessions, military preparatory training and reserve rallies.

Training and Management of Leadership Cadres

To be effective individual training requires that personnel slated for leadership positions in reserve units:

- be selected with care,

- receive training adapted to their billet before being assigned,

- be trained in the context of the branch of the army where their job is, and

- be able to be promoted, at the very least the best ones among them.

A regimental consultative committee is being set up in each reserve regiment in order to insure better coordination among responsible authorities. This committee's mission will be:

- to decide on the reserve unit's leadership roster and submit it for approval of cognizant authorities,

- to specify needs in terms of training periods and advanced training periods, and

- to express an opinion on proposed advancements.

These various measures meant to improve individual training of reserve cadres fall under the general policy decided on in 1979 in the context of the "reserves" component within army reorganization. The measures are aimed mainly at improving further the standard of reserve cadres who hold responsible positions in derived units.

Each year individual training involves 3,000 reserve officers and 2,200 reserve NCO's.

As a general rule, individual training of the lower enlisted ranks is given on the occasion of reserve unit meetings and in the context of their particular mobilization job. However, short-term training periods are planned to make sure certain specialists keep up or improve their skills, particularly radio operators. The toal of collective training of cadres and troops is to develop the capability of units to set themselves up and acquire a minimum amount of cohesion.

- Collective Training of Reserve Cadres

Since the new FA mobilization plan has been set up, the conception and organization of collective training are derived from the following principles:

- each reserve unit is associated with a regular army corps or agency, a parent or sponsor organization tasked with providing it support, advice and guidance: that is how the principle of derivation is applied in the training area;

- cadres, and particularly those occupying key positions on headquarters staffs and in units, are trained on a priority basis (command teams);

- the capability of large units to set themselves up is periodically tested during training sessions involving the whole unit from top to bottom.

Collective training is carried out in the context of:

- selective training sessions, when those sessions bring together command teams or the entire body of cadres, and

- top-to-bottom training sessions, when the sessions involve all personnel in the same unit. Reserve divisions, school divisions, logistical brigades and some general reserve units have been categorized as priority 1. As such they have the benefit of both selective and top-to-bottom training sessions in the framework of a training cycle lasting 5 years.

It is a 3-year cycle for priority 2 units, which are staffs, divisional regiments, and border regiments.

Year	Priority 1 Units 5-Year Cycle	Priority 2 Units 3-Year Cycle
1	Selective training session for command teams: 4 days	Selective training session for command teams: 4 days
2	Selective training session for command teams: 4 days	Selective training session for command teams: 4 days
3	Training session for entire body of cadres: 4 days	Training session for entire body of cadres: 4 days
4	Top-to-bottom training session: -cadres: 5 days -lower-ranked enlisted: 4 days	
5	Selective training session for command teams: 4 days	

The following program has been established:

-1st DI: 11th D.I. [Infantry Division*]

-1979: 114th Infantry Division - 109th Infantry Division

-1980: 111th Infantry Division - 104th Infantry Division

-1981: 112th Infantry Division - 151st Infantry Division - One district from the Rhine crossing zone

-1982: 102d Infantry Division - 127th Infantry Division - 110th Infantry Division - 131st Infantry Division

-1983: 106th Infantry Division . . .

Optional Training

- Centers for Preliminary and Reserve Training

Individual and collective training of reserve personnel are only given to reservists who have a mobilization assignment.

That does not mean that the army ignores non-assigned reserve cadres. What is referred to under the heading of "optional training" covers various activities which are exclusively voluntary:

- participation in military preparatory training

- informational activities: lectures, equipment presentations, reserve days, etc.

- shooting rallies and contests

- voluntary training periods in units and staffs

All of these activities which contribute directly or indirectly to reserve training have up to now been carried out in the context of various agencies administered and led for the most part by reservists themselves:

- Reserve Military Information Center (CIMR)

- Reserve Officer Advanced Training Center (CPOR)

- Reserve NCO Training and Advanced Training Center (CEPSOR)

Therefore, the army chief of staff has decided out of concern for effectiveness and getting a return out of training to have all informational and training activities which are carried out for the benefit of volunteer reservists and young people before they go into the military coordinated at the department level. To this end, Centers for Preliminary and Reserve Training (CEPR) have been set up in all the departments where this is possible.

Centers for Premilitary and Reserve Training have been put under the authority of the departmental military representative. The mission of the centers is to organize, lead, and supervise:

- dissemination of information for young people and reserve cadres,

- recruitment of young people at the premilitary stage,

- keeping relevant reserve cadres in training via optional or voluntary training in order to participate in preliminary training of young people, and

- training the young people registered for higher military preparatory training and for military paratrooper preparatory training.

Management cadres for these centers are provided by regular army personnel belonging to formations based in the department as well as by reserve cadres who have signed an active reserve contract.

When there is an optional amount of "reserve" and "military preparatory training" activities, the Centers for Premilitary and Reserve Training will be organized in accordance with the diagram below:



In departments with a small number of reservists and a very small number of regulars based there, the Centers for Premilitary and Reserve Training can be reduced to a single cell.

Specialist Officers

- ORSEM's [Staff Corps Reserve Officers]

ORSEM's are descendants of the former regular army staff corps abolished after the war of 1870. They are the result of a 19 November 1900 ministerial decision which established a "special training school for staff corps officers of the reserve and territorial forces." At that time the school was put under the administration of the chief of staff of the military government of Paris.

On 2 December 1911 it was put under the administration of the commanding general of the Armed Forces War College with the name of "Training School for Army Reserve Staff Corps Officers."

Making the ORSEM's subordinate to the Armed Forces War College is a clear indication of their institutional goal which is to put reserve officer staff specialists at the disposal of that command who have the advantage of special training which puts them on a level with regular army staff officers who have completed Staff College and which thereby makes the reservists able to effectively cooperate at any time with those regular army staff officers.

As a matter of priority ORSEM's are in fact meant, during time of crisis as during wartime, to reinforce staffs and agencies at all levels and to carry out missions of

responsibility: territorial army staffs; regular army staffs at division level, corps level, and army level; agencies in central administration or attached to it (particularly the First Logistical Command); and liaison agencies.

The number of ORSEM's has gone from 139 in 1900 to 2,300 officers holding that title in 1979, to which must be added 100 trainees. Meanwhile, 300 to 400 officers are preparing to take the examination.

In fact, ORSEM's are mainly recruited via competitive examination at the rate of about 100 volunteer reserve officers a year. Furthermore, from among regular army staff officers who have completed Staff College and who left the army early about 30 are recruited, and 5 to 6 per year are recruited from among auditors at the IHEDN [Institute for High National Defense Studies].

Officers who are examination candidates are chosen from among lieutenants under 31 and captains under 35 who have previously gone through 2 years of preparatory courses given in the regions.

The hundred or so selected in this fashion attend a 3-week training period full-time in August at the ORSEM Higher School. For one more year, during which they carry the title of trainee, they undergo staff monitoring at the end of which time they are declared to be ORSEM-designated and receive an assignment. Then during their entire career as ORSEM's they attend annual compulsory courses totalling 40 hours of instruction a year.

Recruitment is still done by the Region as is preparatory training of candidates. Preparatory courses were recently instituted in several of the national professional training schools (the Polytechnic School, ENA [National School of Administration], HEC [School for Advanced Business Studies]).

Maintaining one's place among the ORSEM cadres is based on attendance and continuous training. Officers who are not able to regularly attend the courses are put at the disposal of the branch of the army they are from; generally this happens at the end of 3 years of recorded failure to attend.

In this fashion a uniform and effective body of specialists can be maintained whose activity is based on voluntary service and ties to the army.

Although work subjects are figured out in a centralized fashion by the ORSEM Higher School, which is one of the four establishments in the Army Higher Military Education System, the dissemination of training is decentralized into Regions, Divisions and Centers. There are 70 Centers spread out in France, throughout various territories and overseas departments and in Morocco.

Whenever possible, courses are given "a la carte" in order to take into account the officers' professional and civilian obligations. Thus the large Paris Center, managed directly by the ORSEM Higher School, offers courses meeting either two times a month in the evening or bunched together on a monthly or trimonthly basis or else put together into annual one-week full-time periods which are meant especially for officers residing overseas.

Officers holding the title of ORSEM also receive training which varies according to their assignments. In addition other specialized sessions exist for certain particular areas (intelligence, SIRPA [expansion unknown], Transportation Commissariat, logistics, etc.).

Moreover, ORSEM's make up committees to study certain subjects determined by the command, and, whenever the occasion presents itself, they take part along with their regular army colleagues in exercises planned by the units or Military Regions to which they are assigned. On the national level, a number of ORSEM's also take part in certain ESG (Armed Forces War College) or ESGI (Combined Armed Forces War College) exercises.

Therefore, ORSEM's make up a highly useful and carefully selected body within the reserve officer family. This selectivity is apparent in the statistics regarding their education level which pertain to about 3,000 ORSEM-designates or candidates:

- national professional training schools or higher education: 70 percent

- minimum level of the baccalaureate: 24 percent

- not having passed the baccalaureate: 6 percent

Army Reserve Officer Interpreters (IRAT's)

In times of mobilization IRAT's are slated to fill posts requiring good knowledge of language (staffs, prisoner of war interrogation sections). They are recruited before and after active service. This job category is open to women officer volunteers as a way of performing national service.

Military Transportation Service Officers

Reserve officers in the Military Transportation Service, better known by the acronym ORSMT, make up a very cohesive and homogeneous corps of specialists.

In the event of a crisis or conflict their skills, which are often considerable, would be valuable to the army in the vital and complex area of organizing and following up on Movements and Transportation activity relating to installing forces and to their support.

These cadres are directly under Army Staff Headquarters (Logistical Division) in collaboration with the Military Regions, and they are recruited

- either from among reservist ex-lieutenants or young captains, at the end of an initial two-week training period at the First Operational Logistics Command in Metz.

- or from among officers who have just left regular service and want to serve in their specialty on a reservist basis.

Advanced training for these personnel is handled:

- by EMAT [Army Staff Headquarters] for officers assigned in central administration agencies or to Logistic Regulation and Intervention Detachment [DRIL] Headquarters, or

- by Military Regions or theInter-Armed Forces Transit Base for those who receive an assignment at the level of regional agencies or maritime transit.

The recent force reorganization, the new measures adopted for troop support, and the revision of automated planning of movements and transportation, have led to a broadening of scope for ORSMT's and to raising the level of missions entrusted to them in timeof crisis or open conflict.

In addition, the skills of ORSMT's and their availability make it possible to closely associate them with studies carried out starting in peacetime.

Reserve Advisers

Out of concern for expanding contact between commands and reserve cadres, the army chief of staff has set up positions of "reserve adviser" in the offices of authorities at various echelons: Army deputy chief of staff, inspector of reserves and mobilization, military region commanders, and military division commanders.

These advisers are reserve officers and NCO's serving under "active reserve" contract. They participate in decision-making by providing essential contact information to the authorities to whom they are answerable and vice versa, by communicating information concerning the latter from the command to reserve cadres. Moreover, the advisers are in a particularly good position to play a dynamic role in army-nation relations.

In similar fashion to the recent expansion of the Reserves and Mobilization Inspectorate's powers, the institution of "reserve advisers" shows command desire to specify and actualize the role of army reserves; it has a place in the restructuring of land forces which is currently underway.

Integrated Training in the Navy

Integrated training in the navy is carried out in the regular navy units to which reservists are assigned, with PREMAR and force commanders being responsible for it. This system integrates the involved parties into the unit in which they will serve in time of war. It requires that each commander of a regular navy unit be concerned about the training of his reservists. A second principle followed is that of personalizing relations between units and reservists. Its goal is to make it so that the reservist is a part of the unit to which he is assigned, that he is known there, that he feels at home there. In order to achieve this, personal contact must be established between him and the unit commander.

Accomplishing reserve training sometimes bumps up against certain difficulties because reservists are under job constraints (sudden and unforseen professional activity, or reluctance on the part of their employer) or they have to put up with sizable earnings losses (crew personnel). This then results in withdrawals from the program (around 10 to 15 percent of the personnel who are called back).

To alleviate the difficulties which exist at the time paperwork for the mobilization of certain units is being set up, and in order to facilitate their operations for receiving and integrating personnel, regular navy units, so-called "sponsor" units, have been designated. They prepare for all operational activity involved in embarking personnel, training them, and, in time of crisis, making use of them. This represents a heavy supplementary burden.

Training of Reservists After Naval Service: Organization

- At the national level:

The admiral who heads the DPMM [Naval Personnel] has an IRAM [Naval Reserve Training] flag officer deputy whose role is to determine training objectives, to distribute training funds among maritime authorities with training responsibilities, and to coordinate the activities of these authorities.

- At the regional level:

Training is carried out by PREMAR's and overseas by the COMAR's which have navy training centers (CIRAM's [Navy Reserve Training Centers]) spread out all over.* The CIRAM is the supervisory agency for reservists, the required intermediary between reservists on the one hand and regional maritime authorities and IRAM on the other.

The flag officer heading IRAM is also Naval Reserves and Mobilization Inspector (IRMAR), but in this latter capacity reports directly to the CEMM [Navy Chief of Staff]. He makes sure that the department's directives regarding reserve mobilization and training are carried out.

Thus, reserve mobilization and training are meant to significantly reinforce the navy's combat potential in time of crisis. Therefore reservists constitute an essential element in France's naval dealings.

Training and Drill Periods In the Air Force After Military Service

Because of how they are selected, the majority of personnel with mobilization assignments are already professionally trained. The goal of training them is to keep up their qualifications and to allow them to gradually get used to their particular mission. Training is done "on the job" in the form of training and drill periods.

Two kinds of training are used:

For non-flight personnel --

- collective or top-to-bottom meetings are called for missions requiring drills: security, surveillance, anti-air artillery, etc.

- there is individual training for cadres who have individualized jobs.

Reservists receive pay for these compulsory training periods. In addition to the compulsory training periods there are also unpaid "contact" days and voluntary training periods.

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*Within the country: Cherbourg, Brest, Toulon, Paris, LeHavre, Bordeaux, Marseille, Strasbourg, Dunkerque.
Overseas: Tahiti, Noumea, La Reunion, Fort de France.

For flight personnel --

Two possibilities are open to flight personnel: territorial air sections (SAT), or a few copilot slots in COTAM [Military Air Transport Command ?] or Fouga in a squadron context.

Territorial air sections are units carrying out information collection for the benefit of the Territorial Operational Defense Force. They are equipped with airplanes requisitioned from flying clubs.

In peacetime the air force assigns each SAT pilot training hours to be accomplished out of his flying club. In addition, drills take place for which planes are rented by the air force from flying clubs.

Role of "Reserve Air Centers for Advanced Training and Information" (CAPIR)

CAPIR's make it possible to keep in contact with reserve personnel not holding a mobilization assignment. So in order to strengthen the ties between the air force and its reservists it has turned out to be necessary to expand the centers' activities while maintaining their threefold information, training, and leadership mission for military preparation in the air environment. The improvements which are sought after involve mainly military training.

The goals of the CAPIR's are:

- to expand the ties between the air force and its reserves; and

- to prepare certain reservists among the cadres to carry out the tasks which might be entrusted to them.

In order to carry out these two missions, they provide information on national defense in general and the air force in particular and training or an advanced kind and for keeping up. They are also tasked with participating in leadership in military preparation in the "air."

The information given out in the CAPIR's is on armed forces defense policy, air force activities and operation, and the administration and management of air force reserves.

Meetings at and informational visits to air bases, particularly the home base, are organized. Lectures of a military or technical nature with regard to national defense, the armed forces, and particularly the air force round out this information dissemination. Added to this are visits to military installations or industrial establishments or relevance to the armed forces.

Information relating to the air force and its activities as per regional or local directives is also disseminated (word-of-mouth information, "air" information bulletin, base newspapers, etc.).

Training for keeping up involves reservists without mobilization assignments. It includes professional training and military training.

Reservists are made up of groups of specialists. Under the authority and with the help of the CAPIR's commander, a number of young reservists are tasked with organizing and leading professional training for keeping up relevant to each of these groups.

A special effort is made in military training to build up programs of shooting sessions which are a highly motivating activity. The CAPIR's cadre members are also brought to participate as often as possible in basic combat drills.

CAPIR members can be called up in excess numbers when units are collectively called up. The reservists with the best attendance records are put on base reserve status if they do not already have a mobilization assignment.

Advanced training is offered to non-officer personnel among cadres. This allows them to take advanced training, the goals of which are:

- in accordance with certain local needs, to give highly motivated reservists a higher or new qualification, making it possible for them to receive a mobilization assignment; and,

- to allow certain reservists to obtain the necessary qualifications to compete for advancement.

Each CAPIR is attached to an air base which provides it with the support it needs in order to operate.

Outlook For the Future

The effort which has been undertaken during the last few years to reassert the value of reservists is continuing. It focuses on the improvement of training. Budgetary constraints make it imperative to look for the best return possible. Also sought after is better adaptation of personnel to mobilization jobs. Mobilization billets for officers coming out of their draft national service have been increased. Ties between the air force and reservists are being strengthened. Newspapers and informational documents published by the bases to which reservists are assigned are being sent to those reservists. Facilities on the bases are being opened to them. Reservists are more closely integrated into the body of regular service personnel. In this fashion the dialogue between the armed forces and the nation is being expanded. The air force is making efforts to instil into young reserve officers during their national service a sharp awareness of the reality of military problems and of their missions.

Training in the Gendarmerie

In order to improve collective training of reserve units and to test their operational capability, the Gendarmerie holds regular training sessions of squads which are derived from Mobile Gendarmerie squads and of Departmental Gendarmerie intelligence squads.

This type of training period is conducted over either 3 days, in the form of cadre drills (officers and NCO's), or 6 days, in the form of top-to-bottom meetings for the unit as a whole.

Gendarmerie reserve officers receive advanced training courses from junior officers in the Gendarmerie.

Each semi-annual shipment includes a "documentation" sub-file, a "technical subject" sub-file, a "tactical subject" sub-file, and guide sheets making it possible to resolve specific cases laid out.

Training in the Medical Corps

As a rule training is meant only for reserve officers who have a mobilization assignment. However, it cannot be limited to those personnel alone, since the armed forces have to respond to the concern of reserve officers about expanding their general and technical knowledge, improving their image, and expanding their ties with the nation.

The goal of training during training periods carried out on an individual or collective basis is to keep up the professional level acquired on active duty and to give reserve officers the means with which to better prepare themselves to carry out their functions in a unit being set up or a unit receiving reinforcements during mobilization.

Training is compulsory or optional depending on the activity, the personnel it is aimed at, and the assignment systems.

Compulsory individual training, which is given in the form of training periods and of advanced training periods, is dependent on the amount of funds allocated to those activities.

Voluntary individual training makes it possible for reserve officers to increase their general and technical knowledge and to keep up contact with the armed forces. It is given in the form of voluntary training periods and lecture cycles.

Collective training allows a unit's cadres to evaluate the operational usefulness of the cadres who make up that unit.

Training is provided by the various regional headquarters of the Medical Corps which organize the different activities and training cycles in accordance with command directives.

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